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Abstract 
 
Uruguay generates a variety of policy outcomes. First, there are relatively stable 
policies, such as those allowing for the commercial and financial openness of the 
country. Then there are inflexible and low-quality policies, such as those related 
to social policies, some areas of state reform (civil servants’ wages and hiring 
mechanisms), the bankruptcy regime, etc. Finally, there are volatile outcomes 
resulting from economic shocks, such as those related to discretionary public 
spending. In the cases in which historical precedence or the availability of 
external enforcement devices do not lead to relatively stable policies, the main 
outer feature of Uruguayan policies is rigidity. The source of rigidity appears to 
be a mixture of institutional factors (multiple veto points, factionalized parties and 
direct democracy mechanisms) and political conflict (divergent policy 
preferences), in which it is very costly to move from the status quo due to the 
credible threat of policy reversal. Political institutions in Uruguay are conducive 
to achieving political compromise in the short run, but cannot effectively 
cooperate in establishing stable and flexible policies in the long run. The 
difficulty in achieving intertemporal political exchanges is consistent with the 
main characteristics of the political environment: a large number of key political 
actors and veto points, a relevant amount of unobservable political maneuvering, 
poor enforcement technologies in the economic arena, a politically influenced 
bureaucracy, political exchanges occurring outside the legislative arena, a 
particular constellation of parties and preferences and costly policymaking and 
institutional changes. 
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1. Introduction 
Uruguay is the most enduring democracy in Latin America. To a large extent, its long-lasting 
democratic process has been sustained by an institutionalized party system, in which only two 
parties (Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional) have dominated the political scene since the 
country was established. In the long run, therefore, the Uruguayan political system reflects an 
important level of stability and continuity that makes it almost an exception in the regional 
context. Since the return to democracy in 1985, Uruguay has experienced a high degree of 
political inclusion and political and social participation. Intensive negotiations took place 
between political parties and social organizations, each holding a significant degree of power. 
Nevertheless, it has not been easy to reach agreement in a number of important policy areas. 
Uruguay is a pluralistic system with strong parties and is a highly participative 
democracy. Indeed, the pluralism in the political institutions and party system is nourished by the 
participation of citizens and social groups, especially through certain procedures of “direct” 
democracy (plebiscites, referendums) on constitutional matters, human rights issues and 
privatizations. The key role played by the state stems from a long historical process of political 
leadership and party performance, which has had long-lasting effects on citizenship and civic 
culture. 
Uruguayan public opinion profiles (Latinobarómetro poll series 1995-2002) show the 
citizen/voters’ attachment to democratic culture and the state: (i) Uruguay and Costa Rica have 
the greatest support for democracy and the lowest tolerance of non-democratic regimes. (ii) 
Uruguay has the highest level of interpersonal trust and Uruguayans have the most confidence in 
their political parties. Trust in government is above average, but is a long way from the top. (iii) 
Uruguay’s endorsement of the free-market economy is by far the lowest in Latin America. (iv) 
Only Argentina has a more negative view of privatization than Uruguay. 
Uruguayan public opinion exhibits high levels of statism. Uruguayans’ preference for 
state over market was explicitly demonstrated in referenda: one opposing the privatization of the 
state-owned telephone company in 1992 and one opposing a law which would have allowed the 
state-owned oil company to associate with a private partner in 2003. In the first instance, 72 
percent of the electorate voted against the law, and in the latter 62 percent did so. There also 
were other situations when the mere threat of a referendum blocked market-oriented reforms, 
such as when Congress revoked articles that would have allowed for the partial privatization of   6
the state-owned cell phone company in 2002 immediately after the signatures calling for 
referendum against them were collected.  
But this Uruguayan preference for the state not only implies that resources must be 
concentrated in the state apparatus, but also that the state should have the ability to satisfy every 
kind of “social” demand. In the same way that market-oriented reformers think that privatization 
serves to tie their hands in terms of resource allocation, state-oriented supporters believe state-
controlled, discretionary resource allocation is the only way to meet the needs of different 
“weak” interest groups (pensioners, unions, debtors, etc.). Therefore, people tend to oppose not 
only market-oriented reforms, but also any kind of reforms that pretend to define rules precisely 
and provide rationality to public administration. This last feature of the Uruguayan political 
landscape sits well with constituency-oriented politicians, who prefer to manage resources in a 
discretionary way rather than in a more institutionalized manner. 
In 2000, around 80 percent of Uruguayans thought that the state should control most 
public companies. This opinion was shared by 90 percent of those who consider themselves to be 
left wing, 82 percent of centrists, and 71 percent of those who consider themselves to be located 
on the right side of the ideological spectrum. More recently, the public has favored “de-
monopolization;” 50 percent of those surveyed see it as a positive option, including 44 percent of 
those who think of themselves as being on the left. Moreover, 48 percent of the people surveyed 
believe that it is a good thing for private capital to be involved in the development of public 
companies, while 35 percent think that de-monopolization is inconvenient (Cifra Survey, 2000). 
The democratic values of the Uruguayan people are associated with the centrality of 
politics in daily life. However, a declining interest in politics has been observed in recent years, 
although it tends to increase during elections. This process is the result of a long period of public 
discontentment that can be traced back to the mid-1950s, when the import-substitution model of 
development suffered a crisis. From that moment on, the idea that the country is in crisis and in a 
constant state of deterioration has become an idiosyncratic feature of Uruguayan culture. It can 
be argued that the recent electoral growth of the left has been fed by Uruguayan voters’ political 
disenchantment, which began long before the left’s success in the electoral arena. The impact of 
this disenchantment does not consist exclusively of widening the left’s electoral base but is also 
reflected in an electoral circulation between and within the traditional parties.   7
Some of the distinctive features of Uruguayan democracy, reflected in its institutions 
(parties and party system) and in the preferences of public opinion, make it almost an exception 
in the Latin American context. In those contexts where the party system is highly 
institutionalized, parties and their leaders help shape the preferences of voters, but they also 
follow public opinion.
1 Because of this, the preferences of the public are, as such, indiscernible 
from the policy preferences of the leadership and of the Uruguayan parties in general. In other 
words, Uruguayan parties strongly support the democratic process and its institutions, and the 
party system reveals a certain level of polarization regarding some policy issues such as state 
participation in the economy. 
Uruguay has a pattern of implementing policies and reforms that permits progress in an 
incremental fashion. This incremental feature of the Uruguayan PMP is the result of the 
prevailing institutional engineering (electoral and regime rules) and the transformation of the 
party system in recent years (electoral realignment and substantive changes in party functions 
and strategies). 
Uruguayan political parties are the main actors both in the government and in the 
opposition, shaping the processes and contents of major public policies. Particular attention shall 
be paid to the shift from “triangle” politics to bloc politics. To the extent that the leftist front (the 
FA) grows, the Blancos and the Colorados—who have been rivals throughout Uruguayan history 
and have been competing against each other in the new democratic period—are nevertheless 
going through a process of “convergence.” Even when they are still competing, they reach 
compromises and form coalitions, thus creating a political pole and an ideological family. On the 
other side, the leftist FA is developing as the dominant opposition force, putting forward its 
positions against liberal initiatives and privatization. These patterns of competition and 
cooperation are central to explaining the different chapters of the politics of reform and their 
outcomes. 
Uruguay is able to generate different kinds of policy results. First, there are relatively 
stable policies, such as those allowing for the commercial and financial openness of the country. 
Second are policies characterized by a low volatility, but which are inflexible and of low quality, 
                                                 
1 Even though this seems as if politicians follow public opinion preferences, during direct democracy events like 
plebiscites and referenda, party guidelines have proven to be the decisive factor over the outcome. As suggested by 
Altman (2002): “When Uruguayans go to the polls to decide a popular initiative, they mainly take into considertion 
their political faction’s suggestion.”   8
such as those related to social policies, some areas of state reform (civil servants’ wages and 
hiring mechanisms), the bankruptcy regime, etc. Finally there are volatile outcomes resulting 
from economic shocks, such as those related to discretionary public spending. 
Consistent with the analytic framework, the resulting political decisions do not depend 
solely on the political institutions but also on the transaction-cost characteristics of the different 
arenas, such as political and social preferences, the demands of intertemporal exchanges, 
different sets of political and social actors and the availability of enforcement mechanisms. This 
constellation of policies can emerge from an institutional environment that does not facilitate 
intertemporal exchanges and cooperation, due to the relevant ingredients contained in the 
description of political institutions. 
In the cases in which policies are relatively stable, political preferences tend to be 
convergent and the expected gains from political conflict are not significant. Additionally, 
external enforcement mechanisms could be available through strategies such as “tying one’s 
hands.” The commitment technology was not provided by the working of the political system 
itself, but via external “enforcers.” Here historical precedence could also play a key role, making 
it very costly to reverse policies in several areas. In the cases in which policies are rigid and low-
quality, political preferences tend to diverge but the cost of implementing safeguards is relatively 
low. The rigidity emerges from the need for political safeguards, and the low volatility is 
consistent with the fact that institutional change is very costly in Uruguay. This can be 
characterized by the presence of political threats and the perception of politicians that the 
probability and costs of having their policies reversed are high. In the cases of volatile outcomes, 
this result is determined by the absence of stable and adaptable policies across economic shocks. 
Decisions here are delegated by the Executive, particularly in the implementation stage. This is 
not the result of political conflict, but of an inability to set rules with a long-term perspective. 
Political institutions in Uruguay are conducive to political compromise in the short run, 
but not to effective cooperation regarding stable and flexible policies in the long run. With the 
new constellation of parties and political preferences, there is a greater uncertainty about the 
ability to cooperate in the future. 
The difficulty in achieving intertemporal political exchanges is consistent with some 
characteristics of the political environment. The number of key political actors and veto points in 
several areas is relatively large and does not facilitate cooperation, even if political leaders have   9
some intertemporal linkages. A relevant amount of political maneuvering is not openly 
observable, although some transparency emerged in recent administrations. Despite the tradition 
of a relatively independent judiciary, enforcement technologies are poor in the economic arena; 
the bureaucracy is crucially influenced by political considerations, relevant and actual delegation 
has not taken place and the courts are not adequately prepared to handle complex economic 
issues. Key political exchanges take place outside the legislature and their certainty, 
observability and enforcement are less obvious in a framework of political fragmentation, a 
particular constellation of parties and preferences and costly policymaking and institutional 
change. Additionally, the workings of the policymaking process suggest that  intra-period 
payoffs from non-cooperation are high. 
Those areas in which the Executive has broader discretion—and therefore requires less 
bargaining and cooperation—tend to exhibit more volatile outcomes, since the Executive has 
some freedom to accommodate them to economic shocks. Again, this is not the result of political 
conflict but of an inability to set long-term rules in an environment characterized by mostly rigid 
policies. An example of this is discretionary public spending. In those areas in which a greater 
participation of the legislature is required and in which the interaction between the Executive and 
the legislature is more intense, policies tend to be rigid. Social policies are typical examples of 
this case. 
In sum, in the cases in which historical precedence or the availability of external 
enforcement devices do not lead to relatively stable policies, the main outer feature of 
Uruguayan policies is rigidity. The source of rigidity appears to be a mixture of institutional 
factors (multiple veto points, factionalized parties and direct democracy mechanisms) and 
political conflict (divergent policy preferences), in which it is very costly to move from the status 
quo because of the credible threat of policy reversal. 
2. Characterization of Public Policies in Uruguay 
In order to develop a tentative characterization of policies in Uruguay along the dimensions 
suggested in Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003) and Scartascini and Olivera (2003), this section 
is divided into two parts. The first part provides different accounts of specific policy areas and 
specific policy cases, offering valuable information regarding trends and specific features of 
Uruguayan public policies. The second part summarizes the tentative description of the country’s   10
policies in terms of their stability, their flexibility to adapt to changing socioeconomic 
conditions, their rigidity, etc. 
2.1 Description of Some Specific Policies 
This section summarizes a wide range of public policies, including some main economic issues 
and measures embedded in the state reform program. 
Trade policies: The policy of trade opening, understood as the process of systematically 
lowering tariffs, was first implemented in 1974, and it brought to an end several decades of the 
import-substitution model of trade policy. This change was a consequence of the fact that the 
deficit in the balance of trade, which came about following the first oil crisis in 1974, could not 
be sustained (see Vaillant, 2003). The process of market opening continued throughout the 
period of the dictatorship, and was not to any great extent reversed when the country returned to 
democracy in 1985. Uruguay joined MERCOSUR and the tariff structure of the bloc was 
adopted in 1995, consistent with the process of a general reduction in tariffs. In the early phase 
of trade liberalization lasting until the early 1990s, a relatively stable group of industries was 
isolated from foreign competition. The existence of an exceptions list improved the chances of 
trade reform because it made the reform more palatable in political terms. In the second half of 
the 1990s, reciprocal trade agreements (preferential or multilateral non-discriminatory) changed 
the political equilibrium of the previous unilateral trade policy. The number of Uruguayan 
industries isolated from the liberalization process was drastically reduced. Indeed, geographical 
reasons largely dictated Uruguay’s decision to join MERCOSUR, although policymakers around 
the region acknowledge the value of the agreement as a “commitment technology” that increased 
their autonomy vis à vis domestic interest groups (see Vaillant, 2003). This process of tariff 
reduction and trade opening can be characterized as a steady movement without reversal, which 
can be considered as an outer feature of this policy. 
It must be stressed that when Uruguay returned to democracy there was no reversal of the 
policy of openness, although there was pressure for a move in that direction. This pressure was 
handled using non-tariff instruments, which provided the desired levels of effective protection. In 
some cases this policy of “contingent protection” was applied to specific sectors (e.g., the 
automotive and sugar industries), and in other cases to sub-sectors or even to particular firms. 
This operated as an escape valve, and it meant that the general policy of reducing tariffs was not 
reversed. Additionally, in 1995, the country adopted the tariff structure agreed to in   11
MERCOSUR. From then on, discretionary activity in trade policy lessened, and was expressed 
through managing the so-called lists of exceptions to the common regime of the common 
external tariff, and exceptions to the free movement of merchandise within the bloc. This was 
called the adjustment regime. In this sense, policies in the trade area became more public- 
regarding. Thus the MERCOSUR agreement operated as a mechanism of external enforcement 
of the policy of openness, limiting the possibility for particular sectors to lobby. It was relatively 
obvious for all relevant actors that a small country like Uruguay has to be open to the world in 
terms of trade. What was not so obvious was the fact that opening to imports is the price a 
country has to pay in order to get into international markets. The Asuncion Treaty represented 
Uruguay’s fundamental acceptance of the need to effectively open the economy, and served to  
tie the government hand in terms of granting sectoral privileges, making the policy less private-
regarding. 
Financial openness: Uruguay started the process of opening the capital account of the 
balance of payments during the 1970s. The motivation behind this policy was the same as that 
behind trade opening, namely the 1974 oil crisis and the need to finance the large trade balance 
deficit that followed. The financial reform aimed to deregulate internal capital markets and 
liberalize financial operations between the country and the rest of the world. The most important 
liberalization measures in the financial sector (i) authorized residents to maintain domestic bank 
accounts in dollars without having to account for the source of those funds, (ii) allowed them to 
maintain any kind of assets abroad, (iii) authorized the profits and capital of foreign agents to 
leave the country freely, (iv) allowed non-financial enterprises unrestricted access to foreign 
credit, (v) authorized commercial banks to accede to foreign credit, and (vi) removed controls on 
the interest rates in a gradual process that lasted until the late 1970s. As in the trade case, this 
policy was managed by the Executive, through the Ministry of Finance. Congress did not 
intervene except to pass certain laws giving powers to the Executive. However, as long as the 
policy consisted of almost total freedom for capital movements, there was little room for 
discretion in its implementation.  
Since the initiation of the reform, which led to financial opening, there has not been any 
attempt to hinder the movement of capital between Uruguay and the rest of the world. The 
economic and financial openness was the result of systematic negotiations with multilateral 
organizations in the early 1980s. During the 1990s, an important wave of capital inflow   12
occurred, which in addition to representing visible technological progress in the financial sector, 
was an endorsement of the global policy. Even during the recent financial crisis in 2002, there 
were no calls to control capital movements, showing a high level of consensus on preferences 
related to this issue and stressing the stability of this policy. 
Pension system policy: In the early 1990s, Uruguay had a social security system with a 
single, pay-as-you-go pillar. It was not in imminent danger of collapse, but it did have serious 
problems connected to (i) a population structure in which pensioners accounted for a very high 
percentage compared to the economically active population,
2 and (ii) the fact that for decades, 
the social security system had been used as an instrument for political favors. In 1989, as the 
result of a plebiscite initiated by various pensioners’ and workers’ organizations, rules for the 
adjustment of pensions were incorporated into the Constitution. The introduction of these rules 
was probably a reaction to the government’s tendency to use pension adjustments in 
opportunistic ways, leading to rigidity and reducing its ability to adapt to macroeconomic 
conditions. This made the economic problems of the social security system worse, and played a 
part in the political system’s decision to take measures to counteract its slide towards insolvency. 
In 1995, Congress passed the Social Security Reform Law, which set up a mixed system. It 
combined an individual capitalization pillar with a pay-as-you-go pillar. The reform was 
moderate insofar as it is estimated that when the system matures, 75 percent of the contributions 
will still be made in the public pay-as-you-go pillar. This pillar is administered by the Banco de 
Previsión Social (BPS), while the individual savings pillar is administered by organizations that 
were created through the reform—the Pension Fund Administrators (AFAPs). The reform 
reduced politicians’ ability to manipulate the sector, using pensions as a typical clientelistic 
resource. In particular, the implementation of work history as part of the reform reduced the 
ability of politicians to grant benefits on a discretionary basis. As in the case of trade issues, 
policies here also seem to be getting less private-regarding. The new stakeholders created by 
law—the administrators of the pension funds—can contribute to the formalization of the pension 
system (see Forteza, 2003). 
                                                 
2 An illustrative indicator is the Potential Dependency Rate (PDR), which is the ratio between the number of peoples 
who could potentially be dependent (those younger than 13 years old + retired and potential retired people) and the 
number of people who could potentially enter the labor force (persons between 13 and the retiring age). The PDR 
was approximately 75 percent at the time of the reform implementation and is estimated to be 65 percent during the 
next 20 years. In comparison, the PDR in Chile was 55 percent in 2000.   13
The social security reform temporarily raises the deficit of the system because of the 
implicit debt of the downsized pay-as-you-go pillar. One of the consequences of this process has 
to do with the fact that the government induces or even forces the administrators of the pension 
funds to invest a sizeable part of the fund in public bonds. In essence, the reform was 
characterized by intense negotiations, involving parties, factions and a large number of interest 
groups and associations, both in the executive and legislative arenas. The result is a rigid scheme 
that tries to avoid opportunistic behavior on the part of politicians by making it more costly to 
grant pensions on a clientelistic basis. The crisis of 2002 cast doubt on the state’s ability to meet 
government bond payments. An eventual failure to meet these obligations would have meant 
expropriations from the individual savings system, since this is a big holder of Uruguayan bonds. 
Utility markets: Utility services have traditionally been provided by public enterprises 
enjoying monopolies in their respective spheres of activity. In the 1990s, moderate market-
oriented reforms were promoted mainly in the electrical energy, communications and fuel 
sectors. These reforms aimed to increase competition in the markets for public services and 
partially privatize the public enterprises. The reforms were carried out through laws that 
modified the definition of the monopolies of the public enterprises and raised the possibility of 
bringing private capital into them. In general, they have been challenged through referendums: 
(i) The 1992 Public Enterprises Law, which partially privatized the state-owned 
telecommunications enterprise ANTEL, was overturned in 1993 in a referendum initiated by 
ANTEL’s employee union. (ii) A 1997 law concerning a new regulatory framework for electrical 
energy was challenged by UTE’s employee union, but this attempt failed. (iii) Legislation that 
dealt with changes in ANTEL’s charter and the opening of international telephony was 
challenged, and the government brought about its abolition in 2002 when a referendum on that 
appeared imminent. (iv) The law for opening the market for refined petroleum products, which 
eliminated ANCAP´s monopoly over the refining and distributing of these products, and which 
made it possible for private capital to enter into the public enterprise, was recently overturned by 
a referendum initiated by ANCAP’s employees. This process is indicative of a lack of basic 
agreement among the main political groups involved. What is more consensual is the use of these 
monopolies as strong contributors of resources to the Treasury. This promoted some efficiency 
improvements in state-owned companies but represents an obstacle in the process of liberalizing 
utility markets.   14
In cases where the reforms went through (electricity, and partially in communications), 
the pace of the implementation has depended on the role the reform policy played at the time, 
i.e., whether there were (i) objectives related to sectoral reforms, (ii) fiscal objectives, which are 
much more important during a crisis, or (iii) external constraints, which have speeded the process 
of electrical interconnection with Argentina or the MERCOSUR bloc. The reform of the 
electricity sector seems to be a paradigmatic case here, since it is a reform achieved by a law that 
was not overturned, though seven years later it still has not been implemented. 
Interest groups also play a relevant role in resisting some reforms. While unions do so by 
promoting referenda, other groups defend their interests in a more subtle way in the policy-
implementation stage through interactions with the Executive and the political parties. 
Broad policies in utility markets tend to be relatively rigid when they are the result of 
interaction between the legislature and the Executive: (i) the very existence of the state-owned 
companies is established in the Constitution, (ii) the mechanisms for appointing and firing the 
board members of these companies are also noted in the Constitution, and (iii) several laws are 
very specific in terms of operational procedures, eliminating some discretion in terms of business 
strategies, association with private firms, etc. 
Fiscal policies: Since 1990, the tax burden has increased considerably, growing from 25 
percent to more than 30 percent of GDP in a decade (the highest possible in the region). The 
structure of this income remained basically unchanged: the taxes on consumption, the IVA 
(value added tax) and IMESI (sales tax), accounted for 65 percent of income at the start of the 
period and stood at the same level at the end. Total income increased because of rises in the rates 
charged and a widening of the base where the tax was levied. 
The tax administration system presents serious drawbacks, showing relatively high levels 
of evasion. Although there were a number of projects to reform this system, they were not passed 
approved by Congress. During the period, there was a continual process of creating, abolishing 
and modifying taxes, and this allowed for a discretional management of fiscal income policy. In 
particular, tax exemptions were used  to give attention to private interests. However, this feature 
involved a relatively small group of taxes, and the taxation structure that accounted for the 
greater part of fiscal income remained unchanged.  
Expenditure also increased over the decade, but by a smaller proportion than the increase 
in income. In 1989 a plebiscite that index-linked pensions to the past rate of inflation generated   15
significant fiscal problems on the spending side. In the five years immediately following the 
plebiscite, the deficit in the social security administration (the Banco de Previsión Social) 
jumped from 2.5 percent to 6.3 percent of GDP. The plebiscite had the effect of making social 
security expenditure non-discretional. In response to this problem, Congress passed a reform of 
the social security system in 1995. This reform did not change the fact that expenditure on social 
security remained outside of government control, but it did establish actuarial bases for the 
system that would be sustainable in the middle and long term. 
The amount of salaries paid by the public sector also remained constant (in terms of 
GDP) throughout the period. The outstanding policy move in this area began in 1996 with the 
rendering of accounts by a single article
3  to avoid having to submit the revised annual budget to 
Congress (maintaining the five-year budget without any modifications). This had the effect of 
avoiding discussion and negotiations with the public employee unions, and thus removed the 
possibility of increasing expenditure in this area. The price the government paid for this strategy 
was that it made the budget process very inflexible.  
Public-sector investment remained stable over the period until 2002, when there was an 
abrupt fall due to the generalized economic crisis. Fluctuations in the management of public-
sector investment have a negative effect and generate harmful cycles, as has been well 
documented in the case of road infrastructure. Investment in public enterprises also fell as a 
response to fiscal requirements; investment decisions in state-owned enterprises are now 
negotiated with the Planning and Budget Office and the Ministry of Finance during bargaining 
over the transfer of profits. 
Almost all of the items on the spending side are essentially rigid and non-discretionary. 
Broadly speaking, half of public expenditures go to social security and one fourth goes to wages. 
Interests and debt repayment are also outside government control. Therefore, public sector 
investment is the “adjustment variable” of spending to generate fiscal income (which is very 
procyclical). The volatility in this item is the result of the absence of countercyclical   
mechanisms in the remaining items of public spending, in a context in which tax burden had 
reached a point where it is difficult to impose any new increase.
4 
                                                 
3 The Uruguayan budget bill is a five-year program (Presupuesto Quinquenal) with yearly revision bills (Rendición 
de Cuentas) proposed by the executive and approved by the legislature. 
4 Besides having a very low investment rate, the volatility of public investment makes it even more inefficient.   16
State reform: The design and implementation of state reform programs in Uruguay were 
traditionally the responsibility of diverse public offices with overlapping functions and deficient 
coordination, and with an important lack of human, technical and financial resources. In 
addition, legal measures related to state reform resulting from the dealings between the 
Executive and the legislative branch used to be quite inflexible due to political safeguards, 
though the implementation of reform policy needed room for adjustment. This affected the 
quality and coherence of the measures finally implemented.  
The process was modified in 1996 with the creation of an articulated proposal on state 
reform of the central administration. The strategy was to pass the essential legal framework to 
implement the programmed measures in Congress and to establish an institution responsible for 
implementing the program. This framework allowed the Executive to define some regulations by 
decree, which increased flexibility in policy implementation, but also increased the effectiveness 
of lobby groups to influence the final outcome.  
Three aspects of the reform process must be noted. First, measures related to state reform 
that emerge from an interaction between the Executive and the legislature tend to be rigid due to 
political safeguards. This applies to hiring civil servants, setting public wage scales, firing 
employees, etc. Second, reform policy tends to be more volatile at the implementation stage 
because of greater executive discretion and a poor observability of this discretion. This process is 
influenced by the action of interest groups, which affect specific decisions in the implementation 
stage. Third, measures that can be implemented as expected are those tied to external 
enforcement mechanisms such as the conditionality of financial disbursements by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). In these cases, the IDB’s conditionality plays a role when 
aligned with the government’s goals, by providing ammunition for the government to weaken 
those who oppose reform. Nevertheless, when all aspects of the state reform process are 
considered,  they do not comprise a coherent and predictable policy as a whole, and an overall 
rigidity remains. 
2.2  Tentative Characterization of Policies in Uruguay 
A brief overview of the main characteristics of economic policies in Uruguay suggests that the 
country is able to generate diverse kinds of results. First, some policies seem to be relatively 
stable and are the result of a long-term perspective, such as the commercial and financial 
openness of the country. While some debate existed prior to the early 1980s, it is unusual today   17
to find voices in the political arena demanding a “closing” of the economy in the commercial or 
financial sectors. Historical precedence also plays a role, since it is very difficult now to 
conceive of retreating from MERCOSUR or closing the financial sector of the economy after the 
respective advances in both arenas. Second, there are some areas in which policies are 
characterized by low volatility, but they tend to also be of low quality and to show important 
signs of inflexibility. These are policy areas in which there are very large institutional costs of 
making and changing policy decisions and in which rigidity is the price to be paid for political 
protection against future reversals. These areas include pension policies, some areas of state 
reform (civil servants’ wages and hiring mechanisms) and fiscal policies, among other examples. 
Third, some outcomes show volatility since they are not subject to specific policies with a long-
run perspective, and they are affected by the result of other rigid policies. For example, public 
sector investments are the “adjustment variable” of global fiscal performance, which is plagued 
by inflexibilities in the rest of the items. Therefore, the variable associated with the evolution of 
the business cycle is the investment expenditure of the central administration and state-owned 
enterprises. 
It would not be accurate to describe policies in Uruguay in only one generic fashion, 
since there are different types of outcomes. With one type, the absence of a commitment 
mechanism would make the policy outcome highly volatile (as suggested by the history of trade 
protection and financial opening and closing). External commitment devices associated with 
international agreements, combined with historical precedence, tends to limit the power of 
domestic interest groups. A second group of policies includes those that are highly rigid and are 
kept that way by the blocking power of interest groups combined with voting interests. Thus, 
what exists is a) an increase in the equilibrium by commitment devices in policies that otherwise 
would be highly volatile, and b) huge inflexibilities in areas that also would be highly volatile in 
the absence of rigidities. As for the third type of outcome, it must be noted that the volatility does 
not emerge from the interaction of political actors with opposing preferences, but is the result of 
the inability of the political system to set any fiscal responsibility rules to generate 
countercyclical spending behavior. 
Additionally, the fact that the country generates different types of policies is consistent 
with the analytical framework, since the resulting political decisions do not depend solely on the 
political institutions but also on the transaction-cost characteristics of the different arenas. Not all   18
policy areas imply similar policy preferences, similar demands in terms of intertemporal 
exchanges, the same mix of political and social actors or the same need for external enforcement. 
Several factors distinguish policies in terms of their transaction-cost characteristics, especially 
those related to intertemporal political exchanges: (i) the constellation of political preferences, 
how close they are, how salient the specific issue is and, in general, what are the expected gains 
from the political conflict; (ii) the availability of external enforcement mechanisms, (iii) the 
subset of political actors and veto players, (iv) the relationship between policy design and policy 
implementation in each arena and, consequently, the role of the legislature and the Executive in 
the actual implementation of the specific policy, (v) the cost of implementing safeguards, etc. 
The description mentioned above can be consistent with the Spiller and Tommasi (2003) 
analytical model. This constellation of policies can emerge from an institutional environment 
that does not facilitate intertemporal exchanges and cooperation. In the cases in which political 
preferences are convergent, the expected gains from political conflict are not significant. Two 
examples of this situation are related to the financial and commercial openness of the Uruguayan 
economy, particularly since the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, most of the actors are 
convinced that a small country like Uruguay has to be open to international financial markets, 
since it needs loans and foreign direct investment in the development process. Second, after 
Argentina and Brazil decided to engage in an integration process (MERCOSUR), Uruguay had 
no choice but to join them, since they are its two main trade partners and they have a significant 
impact on Uruguay’s exports, financial markets and tourism industry. Cooperation on these 
issues had to be feasible even under a relatively “weak” institutional framework, because of the 
convergence of political preferences. Additionally, external enforcement mechanisms could be 
available (conditionality with multilateral financial organizations, like the IMF and the World 
Bank, and the MERCOSUR agreement contained in the Asuncion Treaty of 1991). In the latter 
process, the strategy of “tying one’s hands” was very clear and the political system could 
advance in the commercial openness with a depth that not even the dictatorship could. Therefore, 
relatively stable policies are the result of similar political preferences and the ability to generate 
external enforcement mechanisms, even under a political framework that does not encourage 
cooperation in the long run. 
In cases in which preferences diverge but the cost of implementing safeguards is 
relatively low, the emerging policies are rigid and of low quality. Policies related to enrolling,   19
hiring and paying civil servants are one example of this situation. Instead of having a flexible 
strategy for adjusting the size of the bureaucracy, incorporating civil servants into the budgetary 
payroll, hiring based on the needs of the state and the employees’ professional background, and 
remunerating employees according to their opportunity costs, the current policy is characterized 
by the prohibition of enrolling new civil servants in the budget, the virtual impossibility of firing 
them, rigid and incoherent wage scaling, and the belief that every new contract is suspicious 
because of some political abuse of the hiring mechanism. These rigidities emerge from the need 
for political safeguards.  
Another example has to do with bankruptcy procedures. The main law governing them 
has not been significantly changed in the last seven decades, and the results in this policy area 
are very poor. The inflexible mechanisms and the weakness of the institutional framework 
encourage agents to solve the resolution of failed firms outside of the courts or other formal 
procedures. 
In the public sector investment process, volatility is the logical result of an absence of 
stable and adaptable policies in the fiscal arena. Since almost all the rest of the items in the 
public spending side are basically rigid (social security, wages, debt repayment, and so on), the 
procyclicality of fiscal income and the variations in the access to financial markets have to be 
compensated for by the evolution of an “adjustment variable:” public investment. The only 
expected outcome is volatility. Decision-making in this area is essentially the responsibility of 
the Executive.
5 Nevertheless, it worth noting again that this volatility is not the result of political 
conflict, but of an inability to set long-term rules for managing public spending. 
In general, these policies show a visible lack of coordination and consistency, with very 
negative effects on investment in domestic markets. The low quality of these policies becomes 
clear when negative economic shocks occur. This is the case for most of the arenas dealing with 
the rules of the game related to property rights and contracts. This is also the result of a weak 
institutional environment in which interest groups encourage the myopia of the political system. 
In fact, in several areas the rules of the game are blurred and in other areas the rules are well 
defined but poorly enforced. 
                                                 
5 Although the Executive does not directly decide the amount to be invested in state-owned enterprises, it crucially 
affects the decision-making process via negotiations regarding the amount of profits to be transferred from these 
companies to the Ministry of Finance.   20
3. A Description of the Uruguayan Political Process 
3.1  Formal Political Institutions 
The Uruguayan Constitution mandates a presidential regime, though significantly different in 
some ways from the U.S. model. Indeed, the central feature of Uruguayan presidentialism is the 
strong influence that the Executive exerts on the policymaking process through different legal 
mechanisms of controlling the legislative process. Like many other cases in the region, 
Uruguayan presidents have important legislative powers such as total or item vetoes, the 
exclusive authority to initiate bills in strategic areas (budget or tax policy) and  the ability to send 
urgent consideration laws, as well as non-legislative powers such as ministerial appointments 
and other key bureaucratic spots. In the long run, at least since 1930, the executive branch has 
gained substantive power vis-à-vis the legislative branch in successive constitutional reforms, 
including the last amendment endorsed in 1996. 
Despite their institutional powers, most Uruguayan presidents since 1985 have been 
politically weak. This political weakness is the result of two different features associated with the 
party system and the partisan organization. On the one hand, the party system has exhibited an 
increasing level of fragmentation since 1971, and particularly since 1989, with three and a half 
parties (the fraction will be explained below).
6 On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, 
Uruguayan political parties are factionalized, which means that the number of actors and 
hypothetical agents at the bargaining process will be higher than that set by the system.
7 
8 
The transition from a bipartisan system to a multiparty system has meant that most 
Uruguayan presidents since 1989 have been forced to negotiate coalition governments with 
opposition parties and factions. In other words, the multiparty system is the causal factor that 
explains the minority condition of most Uruguayan presidents and has facilitated the emergence 
of coalition governments from the 1990s onward (Chasquetti and Moraes, 2000). Given the 
                                                 
6 The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (on average) for the period 1942-1966 was 2.27, and was 3.07 for 
the period 1971-1999. 
7 Like the cases of Italy, Japan and Colombia, Uruguayan parties are factionalized. However, unlike those cases, 
Uruguayan factions are institutionalized agents within parties and the whole political system. Both Italian and 
Japanese factions are “informal” actors within parties, since the electoral system does not promote or legally 
legitimize those agents. Uruguayan factions are a direct consequence of the electoral rules, and for that reason they 
tend to be stable agents within parties, with their own leaders and organizations (see Section 4.2). 
8 It is important to note that Uruguayan political parties are one of (if not the most) institutionalized parties in the 
region (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). However, because of the factionalized structure, presidents are only factional 
chiefs rather that party chiefs. Those factions are also highly institutionalized in the political process, but show 
higher levels of electoral volatility compared with the parties as a whole.   21
combination of a presidential regime with a factionalized multiparty system, presidents have to 
negotiate inter and intra-party agreements in order to build coalitions or legislative majorities to 
pass their agenda. 
The electoral rules are one of the key factors in understanding the political dynamics 
described above. Presidents are elected for a five-year term with no re-election.
9 Before 1994, 
presidents were elected by a plurality system and a double simultaneous vote (DSV). This 
electoral feature allowed parties to present multiple candidates for the presidential race, given 
that voters cast their ballots primarily for a party and then for a presidential candidate. In this 
context, given that candidates within parties were able to add up their votes (for the party),  the 
person who received the most votes within the party with the most votes became president. A 
constitutional reform in 1996 changed these electoral rules. It eliminated the controversial DSV 
for the presidential election, and set the new election by majority runoff.
10 Additionally, it was 
constitutionally established that all parties have to hold primaries in order to select their single 
presidential candidates. The reform process took place during President Sanguinetti’s second 
administration and was promoted and sustained because of the threat posed by a possible left-
wing (FA) electoral victory. The new electoral rules—specifically the majority run-off for the 
presidential election—favored the tenure of the reformist coalition in office (i.e., either the 
Colorados or the Blancos), 
Uruguay has a bicameral Congress. Senators and representatives are elected by 
proportional representation with closed lists, under a double simultaneous vote.
11 Until 1996, all 
elections were held simultaneously. Currently, legislative elections take place simultaneously 
with the first round of the presidential election. Citizens cast their votes for lists of candidates for 
the legislature (senate and representatives) and the presidency in the same ballot. The Senate has 
30 members elected in a single national district, along with the vice-president. The Chamber of 
                                                 
9 Until the 1966 constitutional reform, presidents and legislators had four-year term mandates. 
10 The 1996 constitutional reform removed the DSV for the presidential elections without affecting legislative 
elections.  
11 The different factions within parties provide party lists for the senate and the lower chamber. On the same ballot, 
the voter casts votes for: a) a presidential candidate and his or her corresponding vice-president; b) a list of 
candidates for the senate, and c) a list of candidates for the lower chamber. Notice that faction leaders have control 
over the nomination, despite the fact that a party authorization is the only requirement for creating a new list. This is 
the case because the system of closed lists and proportional representation guarantees the primacy of leaders within 
each faction. The fact that voters simultaneously cast three votes and that the presidential election is the most 
important race induces voters to “overdeterminate” the presidential election. In turn, the presence of simultaneous 
elections and proportional representation ensures that elected presidents will have a similar number of votes in the 
legislature as that obtained in the presidential race (see Buquet et al., 1998: 8-15).   22
Representatives has 99 members elected in 19 multi-member electoral districts.
12 In the first 
phase, seats are assigned among parties using the D’Hondt formula on a national basis. 
Secondly, the distribution takes place within parties (among factions), also under proportional 
representation, and within districts with a minimum of two representatives for each district. In 
this way, proportional representation is preserved in a perfect fashion among parties, even 
though some disproportionality could appear among factions. In a multi-partisan context, the 
proportional representation system can create minority governments, while the combination of 
single candidates and the majority run-off system—which was established by the electoral 
reform—could contribute to weakening the parliamentary position of the elected president. 
Under the current rules, the legislative representation of the party in government does not have to 
be the biggest in Congress because there is nothing to stop the election of the candidate of the 
second party, whose representation would be second in terms of the number of legislators, as 
happened in the 1999 election. In addition, there is no disposition in the new constitution that 
guarantees legislative weight to the president’s faction. The elected president is the single 
candidate from his party, and voters can vote for him/her together with any of the parliamentary 
lists of that party. The votes that the president’s faction obtains are relatively independent of the 
electoral potential that he/she has, and consequently he/she may be in the minority in his/her 
party. 
The closed and blocked list increases the faction’s leadership power, especially over 
those representatives elected in large districts. In those cases, the leader has important discretion 
in selecting candidates, since he/she has the ability to influence (if not elaborate) the list of 
candidates of his/her faction. On the one hand, this power implies an important disciplinary 
element for the faction and, by extension, for the party. But on the other, the fact that the system 
or the partisan structure allows for competition among factions makes it possible for legislators 
to move from their faction to run in other elections under a different presidential candidate (until 
the 1996 reform) or faction. In addition to those incentives to avoid the discipline imposed by 
faction leaders, representatives elected in small districts have some incentives to cultivate their 
personal reputations. Nevertheless, the constitutional reform mandated that each faction had to 
                                                 
12 The Uruguayan legislature has two large districts. The national Senate, which elects 30 members plus the vice-
president, and Montevideo for the lower chamber, which elects 44 out of 99 members. In addition to these large 
districts, there is one medium-size district (Canelones), and 17 small binominal and trinominal districts 
(corresponding to the countryside departments).   23
present only one list of candidates per district, enhancing the faction leader’s authority to 
coordinate the provision of candidates. The elimination of the accumulation of sublemas (electoral 
alliances among lists) in the election of representatives led to a very big reduction in the number of 
lists presented in 1999, amounting to less than half of those presented in 1994. As long as different 
house lists cannot accumulate votes, the smaller ones either have to join larger ones or unite to build 
a single list among several of them. On the other hand, the reduction in the legislative supply is 
associated with the predomination of the main national factions with respect to local political 
groups, because the new rules enforce a rigid connection between the supply for the Senate and the 
supply for representatives. Consequently, one can expect more disciplined legislative conduct from 
the factional representatives. In sum, faction leaders and particularly presidential candidates have 
control over the nomination process in both large and small districts. These property rights over 
factions allow them to control not only the nomination of candidates for legislative elections but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, faction discipline.
13 
Like presidents, legislators are elected for five-year terms. However, unlike presidents 
who cannot immediately be re-elected for a second term, legislators can be re-elected without 
restrictions. This difference yields specific incentives for the system. Unable to run for re-
election, the president loses power, authority and control over legislators from his own party. At 
the same time, his or her legislators start to build new partisan loyalties (within the party) with 
presidential candidates who have the chance to be elected. Additionally, legislators who seek re-
election in small districts will start to meet their voters’ preferences, whether or not they are 
those of the main party leaders. In this way, the combination of legislative re-election with non-
re-electable presidents creates centrifugal tendencies in the political system that are expressed 
through an extreme weakening of the president’s power toward the end of each mandate. During 
this period, parties are less likely to cooperate in order to pass relevant bills for the president’s 
agenda.  
The Uruguayan institutional design also has diverse mechanisms of direct democracy. 
Among the several existing mechanisms, there are two remarkable constitutional devices. One is 
the use of referenda against laws passed by Congress. In this case, a law can be revoked when 25 
percent of registered voters support a  referendum. Approved laws dealing with taxes or laws 
                                                 
13 There is no compelling evidence showing that small-district legislators are more likely to engage in particularistic 
behavior. Indeed, legislators elected in the capital (M = 44) are more likely to provide constituency service than 
those elected in binominal districts.   24
over which the Executive has exclusive initiative cannot be revoked through this mechanism. 
During the last 15 years, the opposition has frequently used this constitutional device. Indeed, 
when different pressure groups join certain parties and factions in opposing governmental 
policies, the use or threat of using a referendum has acted as an important veto mechanism for 
repealing relevant laws passed by the government.
 14   
On the other hand, the Constitution enables the use of direct democracy to reform the 
Constitution itself. In this case, reformers must introduce the suggested amendment with the 
support of 10 percent of registered voters. During the period from 1985-2003, this mechanism 
was frequently used by different interest groups, sometimes supported by opposition parties 
interested in challenging the Executive’s interpretation of some constitutional prerogatives 
(pensions), or in fixing at the constitutional level the amount of public spending dedicated to 
public education. Although the technical nature of this institution is different from that of the 
referendum, it has also worked as a reactive device against reforms carried out by all 
governments since the democratic restoration in 1985.
15 
3.2 Parties and Party System 
Uruguay has one of the few institutionalized party systems in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1999; 
Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). First, part of this characterization deals with the fact that two of 
the Uruguayan parties (the Blancos and Colorados) are the oldest in the world. While the 
Blancos and Colorados have existed for 168 years, the left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) has been 
                                                 
14 Promoters have been successful on two occasions: combating the privatization of major public firms in 1992 and 
the association of the state oil company with private firms in 2003. They did not achieve their goal of revoking the 
amnesty provided to military involved in human rights violations during the authoritarian regime in 1989. On three 
occasions popular support failed to persuade the required 25 percent of the electorate to make use of the referendum: 
(i) the deregulation of the transmission, transformation, and distribution of electricity in 1998; (ii) the reduction of 
the available period to workers to make claims against employers in 1998, and; (iii) the improvement of public and 
private services, public security and promotion of productive activities as an emergency law passed in 2001. 
Additionally, Congress itself once revoked a law to avoid the use of a referendum that was certain to be 
successful—the partial privatization of the mobile state-owned company. 
15 Two popular initiatives were successful: the adjustment of pensions based on wage fluctuations (1989), and 
pension regulations via budgetary amendments (1994). Retirees and pension holders promoted both plebiscites in 
1988 and 1993, respectively. Two popular initiatives were unsuccessful: a constitutionally fixed budget amount for 
public education (1994), and the financial independence of the judiciary (1999). Both plebiscites were promoted by 
labor organizations associated with public education and the judiciary and, in the latter case, the judiciary supported 
in totum the referendum, including Supreme Court justices.    25
around for 33 years. This longevity reveals stability across time and there are no indications that 
the current system with three parties will undergo a major transformation in the short run.
16  
Until 1971, the Uruguayan party system was robustly bipartisan. Since then, the 
emergence of the FA transformed this format into a multiparty system with three and a half 
parties, if one takes into account the systematic presence of a small fourth actor (Nuevo 
Espacio). In any case, the system is stable and changes in a slow fashion, unlike non-
institutionalized party systems.  
 
Table 1. Effective Number of Parties (1946-1999)* 
  1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999
Electoral**  3.0 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Senate  2.6 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Deputies    2.9 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.3 
* Effective Number of Parties Index (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). Source: Buquet et al. (1998) and Corte 
Electoral. 
**The electoral and legislative ENP was calculated by taking into account the share of votes and the 
number of seats obtained by each party in national elections, respectively.   
 
A second relevant feature contributing to the level of institutionalization is that 
Uruguayan parties are identified as agents with deep roots in society. Both the traditional parties 
and the left-wing Frente Amplio have been the central mechanisms of representation and 
expression of political interests. Uruguayan voters have identified with the Blancos and 
Colorados for decades, and the same has been true for the growing electorate of the Frente 
Amplio. This deep-rooted institutionalization has at least two broad implications. On the one 
hand, it leaves no room for the advent of populist leaders of the sort that have been appearing in 
                                                 
16 There are good reasons to believe that the Uruguayan party system will remain stable in the short run. Part of this 
observation comes from recent polls conducted by different sources indicating that despite some important changes 
in the distribution of votes, there is no reason to believe that any of the two traditional parties will disappear. The 
transition from a bipartisan system to the current multiparty system has been gradual and the same is expected for 
any future changes in a highly institutionalized party system like the one in Uruguay. Furthermore, the electoral 
system does not provide any incentives for a deep transformation of the party system. The new electoral formula 
with runoff elections (ballotage) eliminates the reduction effect produced by the old simple majority or plurality 
system for the presidential election (see Shugart and Carey, 1992). Thus, neither voter preferences nor the new 
institutions regulating elections suggest a dramatic change in the Uruguay party system in the short run.   26
many inchoate Latin American party systems. On the other hand, and more importantly, it is 




Table 2. Electoral Volatility and Vote Distribution (1946-1999) 
  1946 1950  1954 1958 1962 1966 1971 1984 1989  1994 1999 Average
Electoral  Volatility*  13.1  6.1  6.4 17.9 7.6 7.6 8.9  5.2 13.3 11.6  10.0  9.7 
Colorados & 
Blancos 
86.8 90.6  85.8 87.4  91.1 89.7 81.2 76.2 69.2 63.5 55.1  79.7 
Frente Amplio  -  -  -  -  -  -  18.3 21.3 21.2 30.6  39.8  26.4 
* Pedersen Index of Electoral Volatility.  Source: Buquet et al. (1998) and Corte Electoral. 
 
A third factor has to do with the acceptance of elections and parties as the only or best 
mechanisms of expressing popular demands. As previously noted, Uruguay has consistently been 
among those countries in which the population overwhelmingly prefers democracy to any other 
type of political regime. However, it is also true that the parties have lost part of their legitimacy 
in recent years, due in part to the economic crises and also other more general trends of 
disenchantment with politicians here and around the world. Despite those increasing levels of 
disenchantment, however, no outsider or new party has been able to challenge the party system 
as has occurred in other institutionalized party systems such as Venezuela.  
Fourth, Uruguayan parties are factionalized. As mentioned before, this type of internal 
organization is the direct consequence of electoral rules that facilitate the existence of these 
agents within parties. These factions are institutionalized and/or stable groups within parties, 
generally led by presidential candidates or national senators.
18 As can be seen in Table 3, the 
number of factions has remained stable over time. Although the total level of factionalization has 
been high since 1971, and particularly since 1999, the increase in factionalization was due to an 
                                                 
17 For 11 elections held between 1946-1997, Uruguay had an electoral volatility of 9.7. Electoral volatility is 
measured by using the widely used Pedersen index, which measures the percentage of votes that change between 
elections, indicating the amount of voters who switch their preferences among parties. Uruguay received very low 
scores compared to other Latin American countries. According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), electoral volatility 
in Costa Rica was 18.2 for four elections held during 1970-1990,; about 17.7 for four elections in Venezuela during 
1973-1993; and 18.4 percent in Chile for three elections during 1973-1993. 
18 There are no legal impediments to creating new factions within parties. However, beyond the interest of 
politicians and voters, a faction’s relevance in the political system will depend on its ability to remain stable and 
gain parliamentary representation on a permanent basis.   27
increase in the effective number of parties. That is, the Effective Number of Factions within 
“traditional parties” has remained relatively stable over time (before and after 1971), but the 
emergence of the Frente Amplio increased the total level of factionalization given its large 
number of factions. 
 
Table 3. Effective Number of Legislative Factions (Senate) 1946-1999* 
  1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999  Media
Partido  Colorado  2.2 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.7 4.3 2.8 2.4 3.7 3.1 2.0  2.5 
Partido Nacional 
(Blancos) 
1.6 1.4 2.7 2.0 2.5 4.6 3.8 1.8 2.9 4.1 1.7  2.6 
Frente  Amplio  - - - - - - -  2.5  3.3  3.4  4.7  3.4 
* Using the same formula for the Effective Number of Parties, this calculus takes into account the number of lists 
for the Senate as the best proxy for considering factions. Source: Buquet et al. (1998) and Corte Electoral. 
 
Paradoxically, although the Frente Amplio has the largest number of factions, it has the 
highest level of routinization in its internal decision-making process (see Levitski, 2002). 
Compared to the Blanco and Colorado parties, the Frente Amplio has solid mechanisms for 
making decisions beyond factions, with a unique leader and national committees and partisan 
structures that function effectively. The Blancos and Colorados show a similar pattern of 
routinization only when one of the two remains in the opposition.
19 
The existence of factions within parties does not imply that parties are weak. Parties are 
organized around factions, but they are still relevant agents in the political system, since there are 
rules and procedures for making joint decisions beyond factional divisions or policy preferences. 
In any case, Uruguayan parties cannot be considered as unitary actors, but both factions and 
parties are stable agents in the political system. A faction is a national group led by senators or 
national leaders outside the legislature. Within the same ballot, senate lists are followed by 
deputy lists, revealing the hierarchical structure of factions.   
Until 1996, faction leaders were able to make deals with local leaders running for the 
lower chamber, which allowed these politicians to be associated with different national senate 
                                                 
19 Since 1985 the “Mesa Politica” (or literally “political bureau”) has been leading the Frente Amplio, with the 
exception of programmatic issues and the selection of candidates. Something similar happened during the 
governments in which the traditional parties switched in the presidency. In this case, the Blanco and Colorado party 
were led by the “Honorable Directory” and the “National Executive Committee,” respectively.    28
lists or factions. The reform prohibited the accumulation of votes among lists for lower chamber 
seats. More specifically, it reduced the number of factions because the supply of lists had to be 
associated with only one national senate list. Thus, faction leaders have to coordinate the 
selection of candidates among different individuals. Before 1996, potential candidates could 
make deals with different senate lists and gain election or re-election. After 1996, the restriction 
of a single list per faction at the district level reduced the proliferation of factions, since major 
factions have more chances to make deals with local leaders. 
Party leaders have the power not only to control the nomination process but also to 
control party discipline. Since the control of the nomination process relies to a large extent on the 
leaders’ discretion, legislators have strong incentives to follow the faction leader and his policy 
preferences. This is guaranteed by the fact that the closed list and proportional representation 
electoral system itself guarantees that leaders have strong leverage in the nomination process. As 
a result of this type of nomination control, legislators follow faction or party discipline. Since 
faction leaders have control over the nominations, undisciplined legislators will not be endorsed 
for re-election and their chances for gaining endorsement for other career paths are fairly low. 
Several studies suggest that Uruguayan parties are strongly disciplined in Congress 
(Buquet et al/, 1998; Lanzaro et al., 2000; Koolhas, 2003). Using the standard Rice Index,
20 
Table 4 shows the level of party discipline for the period 1985-2003. As can be observed, at least 
since 1985, Uruguayan parties have been highly disciplined when voting in Parliament. In 
addition to those mechanisms involving faction leaders over legislators, other political factors are 
also influencing the level of party discipline. For instance, specific agreements and governmental 
coalitions carried out by the Blancos and Colorados during the last 15 years have had a strong 
influence, in the sense that they have forced faction leaders to fulfill their commitments within 
those political arrangements. In other words, those agreements and coalitions have not only 
served as binding conditions for enforcing party discipline, but they have also served to facilitate 
the policymaking process. According to Table 4, for 86 out of 125 relevant laws passed by 
Parliament during the period under consideration, legislators from the three parties voted 
completely in unison with their parties. 
                                                 
20 The Rice Index is calculated by using the difference between affirmative and negative votes among members of 
the same party or faction for a particular bill. The index varies between 100 and 0, for values of perfect discipline 
and complete indiscipline, respectively. For instance, if a party has 10 members, and six vote in favor of a certain 
bill and four vote against it, the Rice index will assign a value of 20. Similarly, if party votes are completely united, 
it will assign a value of 100, and 0 if it is completely divided between two groups.   29
 
Table 4. Party Discipline in Parliament (Rice Index): 1985-2003 
  1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000  2000-03 
Number of votes *  40  33  34  18 
  RI DV RI DV RI DV RI DV 
Partido Colorado  91  8  87  9  99  1  100  0 
Partido Nacional (Blancos)  94  7  90  8  99  1  100  0 
Frente Amplio  100  0  100  0  92  5  95  2 
* Senate votes on highly relevant laws. 
-  RI; Rice index of Party Discipline.  
-  VD, voting instances in which factions split the party vote. 
Source: Buquet et al. (1998); Lanzaro et al. (2000); Koolhas (2003). 
 
Finally, the party system exhibits a centripetal mode of political competition, with stable 
levels of ideological polarization since the restoration of democracy in 1985 (see Table 5). This 
particular feature of a polity (ideological polarization) has a relevant impact on the way a 
political system is able to handle not only the policy process but also the interaction among 
actors regarding the political regime. Indeed, low levels of ideological polarization are more 
conducive to achieving agreements among political actors, and the democratic process is less 
likely to suffer the policy differences among actors. Inversely, a high level of ideological 
polarization inhibits the ability of agents to achieve agreements and threatens the democratic 
process. More concretely, the level of ideological polarization is a key factor in understanding 
executive-legislative relations, since low levels facilitate the extent to which presidents are able 
to achieve agreements with Parliament.  
In recent years, authors like Gonzalez (1993) have pointed out that the ideological 
distance between the extremes of the ideological spectrum in 1986 was 25 percent less than the 
value shown for the year of the military coup in 1973. More recent measurements (EPI-IEIP-
CIS, 1998; EPE-ICP, 2003) show that the level of ideological polarization remains fairly stable. 
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Table 5. Legislators’ Ideological Identification* 
  Ideological positioning of 
legislator’s own party 
 1985-90 1995-00  2000-05 
Partido Colorado 4.8  5,0  5.5 
N (31)  (20)  (37) 
Partido Nacional  4.3  5.6  5.4 
N (40)  (20)  (27) 
Frente Amplio  2.1  2.9  3.1 
N (24)  (25)  (49) 
Distance **  2.7  2.7  2.4 
* Ideological positioning ranging from 1 to 10, where 
   1= extreme left; 10= extreme right  
** Maximal distance among extreme parties  
Source: González (1993); Alcantara (2000); ICP(2003). 
 
 
As can be observed in Table 5, there has been a meaningful change in the overall system. 
Basically, the whole system moved toward the right with the distances between the extreme 
parties remaining constant. Over time, the Colorado and Blanco parties have become more 
rightist and the Frente Amplio has made a similar move toward the center-left of the ideological 
spectrum. This evidence is consistent with Frente Amplio’s efforts to go beyond its original core 
constituency of labor movements, blue-collar workers and young voters in the capital and 
capture a broader spectrum of the electorate. Overall, any variations observed for earlier periods 
are small enough to continue perceiving the system as having relatively moderate levels of 
ideological polarization. 
3.3  Co-Participation 
The co-participation system has been a key “informal institution” that has paralleled not only the 
evolution of Uruguayan political parties but also of the democratic process itself. This 
institutional arrangement guaranteed that no party would prevail in controlling the entire political 
process and the bureaucratic apparatus (“winners did not take all”). Indeed, the co-participation 
system is the result of a long series of conflicts between the traditional parties occurring since the 
nineteenth century (1872), long before the emergence of the modern democratic process in 1910. 
This system facilitated a form of interaction between the Blancos and Colorados and created 
forms of proportional access to public goods and the decision-making process. Until 1990, the   31
system was viewed as a political practice whereby the winning party was supposed to be 
controlled by the minority party in all major state offices. 
Traditionally, the co-participation system did not imply any form of political support for 
those who won the presidency. Before 1990, political support to elected governments by 
opposition parties was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to gain access to public 
offices and some important state goods. However, President Lacalle (1990-1994) linked this 
access to political support, particularly when it came to the presence of opposition members in 
the Cabinet. In other words, this form of linkage implied a major change of  the old co-
participation system. Formally, the 1996 constitutional reform mandated that political losers will 
only have access to Cabinet portfolios and other public appointments if they are cooperative. 
Otherwise, the Executive has the authority to remove those parties or factions that do not intend 
to support the policies promoted by the president. 
3.4 Bureaucracy and Administrative Capabilities 
In the Uruguayan state apparatus, political rationale strongly prevails over administrative and 
technical considerations. The current Uruguayan state is comparatively large but is 
administratively inefficient, when compared with neighboring countries such as Chile or Brazil. 
The basis of this characterization must be understood in the context of its own evolution. Two 
broad periods must be considered. The first consists of a substantive process of state expansion 
in the economy and the provision of public services. It began in the early twentieth century and, 
unlike most Latin American countries, indicated the emergence of an important welfare state. 
During this period, the Uruguayan state introduced an impressive array of economic regulations 
and policies in which political parties were responsive to the demands of citizens and interest 
groups. Essentially, Uruguayan parties were the key actors in the delivery of public goods and 
benefits on a particularistic basis such as rents and clientelistic practices. This long-standing 
process was facilitated by the fact that parties preceded state formation in Uruguay, and for this 
reason they were also able to expand their own bases. This process involved a substantial growth 
in the number of civil servants and an increasing amount of social services, such as education 
and social security.
21 In such a context, the behavior of the bureaucracy was not ascribed to a 
Weberian structure but to an environment of political patronage and nepotism. The bureaucratic 
                                                 
21 In 1960, 20 percent of the labor force was employed by the state, and 30 percent of the population depended on 
pensions (Alonso and Demasi, 1986).   32
and political spheres were both parts of a complex link.
22 The influence of the political patronage 
involved the lack of the State’s technical capacity.  
The second period began in the mid-1950s after a deep economic crisis that affected the 
country. The Uruguayan state began a very slow period of retrenchment in most economic areas 
and in the delivery of public goods. This retrenchment did not imply a lack of bureaucratic 
strengthening and technical improvement in some strategic areas. Since the mid-1960s, the state 
has been able to implement administrative reforms in public offices, several reforms of its 
informational systems in various policy areas and the rationalization of the budgetary process. In 
the long run, these reforms at the state level have been slow, but certainly real.  
Needless to say, when compared to the mid-1960s, the current Uruguayan state has 
embarked upon smaller levels of economic intervention, though since the mid-1990s, it has 
overseen an important set of reforms undertaken by political parties that produced a drastic 
decrease in the old clientelistic practices. Those reforms occurred in the social security system, 
telecommunications, electricity, water supply and other sets of monopolistic public services. 
These improvements within the administration of the state apparatus implied declining levels of 
political manipulation and intervention in state performance. Nevertheless, the state remains the 
most important agent in the economy, representing 35 percent of the Uruguayan GDP. Currently, 
large areas of the state remain politically controlled, with low levels of technical efficiency. 
As indicated by Spiller et al. (2003), a high-quality bureaucracy that is adequately 
supervised by Congress can contribute to an environment conducive to the intertemporal 
enforcement of political agreements. Scartacini and Olivera (2003) maintain that an organized 
civil service can reduce the ability of politicians to reverse their decisions in response to short-
term considerations. While the former emphasizes the incentives generated by the institutional 
framework, the latter insists on the importance of preventing short-term public interests from 
influencing public policy dynamics. Following Evans and Rauch (1999), Uruguay has one of the 
worst performances of Latin American countries as measured by the “weberianness scale.”
23 The 
authors give Uruguay 4.50 points. At this level, Uruguay outperforms countries like Guatemala, 
Argentina and Ecuador, but it is worse than Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica. 
                                                 
22 Both of the main political parties were the creators and the beneficiaries of a system in which they delivered 
public posts according to voting performances (Zurbriggen, 1999). 
23 This index measures the public bureaucracy’s level of professionalism and influence in the PMP. The country data 
is gathered by sending a questionnaire to selected national experts, which deals with issues such as bureaucrats’ 
recruitment, career patterns, wages and social status.   33
The low level of professionalism of the Uruguayan bureaucracy is even more evident when 
compared to countries of other regions such as Spain, India, Malaysia or Singapore.  
 
















   
     Source: Evans and Rauch (1999) 
 
These authors’ view of Uruguayan bureaucracy is, in general terms, correct. However, it 
is necessary to make an important distinction. Inside state structures  in Uruguay there are 
different levels of professionalism. More specifically, it is necessary to distinguish between 
central government agencies (the different ministries), which have low levels of professionalism, 
and the bureaucracies of the public enterprises (ANTEL, UTE, ANCAP, et.c), which are better 
organized.  
State-owned enterprises have managed to preserve and reproduce acceptable levels of 
professionalism, due fundamentally to their greater levels of autonomy. They can dismiss 
employees with greater discretion than can a ministry within the central administration.
24 They 
also have more autonomy in developing their budgets. This makes it easier for them to escape 
restrictions on salary increases in the public sector that the Ministry of Economy has tried to 
impose in an attempt to control the fiscal deficit. The obvious result is that wages (and therefore 
technical capacity) at state-owned enterprises are considerably higher than in the central 
administration. 
                                                 
24 Civil servants in the central administration have the privilege of “immobility,” a rule that requires an authorization 
from the Senate to remove them. An employee of a state-owned enterprise can be dismissed only by a 
pronouncement of the Directory.   34
However, the boards of these enterprises have been made up of politicians from different 
parties since 1931. This “co-participation” in the management of public enterprises was a 
consequence of a pact made between some sectors of the two main traditional parties. Even 
though the set of rules that regulates the appointment of the boards of public enterprises has been 
changing, the institutional design has always assured that the two parties are represented in them. 
The rule for representation of the major minority in the boards of these enterprises determines 
that the rotation of parties in government does not imply an abrupt change in the policies of 
public enterprises. The fact that politicians are appointed to manage public agencies and state-
owned enterprises implies that they are seldom adequately professionally handled (Rivarola, 
2003). This problem could be solved if politicians would rely on technical support at the party 
level. However, this is not the usual practice in Uruguayan politics. When appointing their 
support and advisory teams, the politicians choose to reward political loyalty rather than 
technical and professional ability. 
Policies designed and implemented at the ministry level have been, in general, more 
unstable and of lower quality than those related to public enterprises. In general, ministers do not 
have an obligation to choose collaborators from other parties, and can appoint a great number of 
“officials for responsible posts” to carry out the most important duties. Additionally, ministers 
receive an administrative machine with low professional skill and very little motivation. Within 
this framework, the bureaucrat will not try to get involved in the implementation of public 
policies, since there is little chance that his knowledge will be taken into account. In the long run, 
this thwarts investment in developing bureaucratic technical capacities. Thus, it cannot be 
expected that the bureaucrat would feels involved in the orientation of the public policy and 
would actively cooperate in policy implementation. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the problems in the bureaucratic structures of the central 
government started to be incorporated into the political agenda. The Hall (1954) and CIDE 
(1965) reports offered organized views of the main problems facing the Uruguayan bureaucracy. 
Among other aspects, these studies showed the need to change from a system structured on the 
basis of political clientelism to one that rewarded merit in the civil service and administrative 
appointments. The understanding of the need for an administrative reform led to the creation, in 
1968, of the National Office of Civil Service (ONSC).   35
Even though clientelism diminished during the military regime, no great changes were 
made in terms of administrative reform. Once democracy was restored, and especially during the 
1990s, new attempts at reform inspired by new public management theories were undertaken. At 
first, Parliament prohibited the inclusion in the budget of new civil servants (this rule has existed 
for more than 15 years). Secondly, Presidents Lacalle (1990-1994) and Sanguinetti, in his second 
presidency (1995-1999), both placed the problem of bureaucratic modernization at the top of 
their agendas. Lacalle implemented a National Program for Debureaucratization (PRONADE) 
that, among other things, strongly modernized rules related to state purchasing (TOCAF) and the 
administrative process (Decree 500/91). Sanguinetti created an Executive Committee for State 
Reform (CEPRE) attached to the presidency. Its creation led to a decrease in the number of 
ministry officials, a concentration of their activities on those defined as “substantive” by each 
public office, the implementation of a system of management evaluation and, based on its 
results, its incorporation into the budget (Ramos, 2003). 
 
Table 7. Civil Servants in Uruguay During the Twentieth Century 
 
Year  Number of Civil Servants  Number of Civil Servants as 
percent Population 
1900  14,500 1.8 
1931  43,220 2.4 
1941  57,200 2.9 
1955  166,000 6.9 
1969  213,001 7.4 
1985  258,000 8.7 
1990  272,000 8.8 
1995  256,000 7.9 
2000  223,619 6.8 
           
           Source: Filgueira et al. (2003). 
 
PRONADE and CEPRE partially achieved their goals. The number of civil servants has 
been reduced but the quality of the bureaucracy in the central government is still insufficient.  
3.5  Specialized Knowledge 
Uruguay exhibits a comparatively low rate of incorporation of specialized knowledge into public 
policies (De Armas and Garcé, 2000),
25 which influences the quality of those policies.
26 The 
                                                 
25 For example, when examining the list of Uruguayan ministers from 1985 onward, it became apparent that very 
few of them pursued graduate studies abroad and none of them had a Ph.D. degree.    36
supply of social research that could be potentially useful in public policies is still comparatively 
weak. Social sciences in Uruguay have had a late development. In Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and 
Chile they were thriving during the 1930s and 1940s, whereas Uruguay had to wait until the 
1960s for significant advances in this area.  Even though in the last 20 years there has been a 
slight tendency to strengthen social sciences, they are still notoriously far behind. In particular, 
there are very few people specializing in public policy analysis. There is some accumulation of 
specialized knowledge in areas such as education, poverty and income distribution, but there is 
little research in industrial policies, farming, technology, etc. In fact, the only available policy 
studies are conducted almost exclusively from an economic perspective.  
The demand for specialized knowledge on the part of politicians is still negligible. 
Political parties never developed cadre-formation policies, and the state does not have 
government schools. The link between social research and policymaking is thus narrow and 
unstable, and there are no institutions to facilitate a meeting of the two. The characteristics of 
public administration do not contribute to the incorporation of specialized knowledge. 
Bureaucracy is weak from a technical perspective, and in the cases in which it is not, it is not 
sufficiently taken into consideration, because it has been excessively subordinated to political 
dynamics (Filgueira et al., 2003). Congress has not built a system of assessment and of advising 
staff, and the parties lack think tanks. In the last 20 years, there has been a more ample use of 
specialized knowledge in public policies than in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the 
Executive’s sphere It has occurred generally as the result of taking advantage of external 
financial support by multilateral organizations.
27 Even so, deficiencies in the Uruguayan political 
process regarding this issue become evident when the country is compared to others in the region 
such as Chile and Brazil (De Armas and Garcé, 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                               
26 The current discussion on how to increment the impact of research on public policies can be found in “Bridging 
Research and Policy,” a project launched by the Global Development Network (http://www.gdnet.org/rapnet/) in 
2002. See also Stone, Maxwell and Keating (2001). 
27 Some of the programs that have led to the generation of specialized knowledge in social policies are: the Social 
Investment Program (PRIS), Strengthening of the Social Areas (FAS), Institutional Strengthening of the Health 
Sector (FISS), Program of Improvement of Quality of Primary Education (MECAEP), and the Program of 
Modernization of Secondary Education and Teacher Education (MES and FOD). The main poles of accumulation 
and production of specialized knowledge in the state are the Planning and Budget Office (OPP) and the Economic 
Research Department of the Central Bank of Uruguay. The Office of Programs and Farming Policy (OP and PA) of 
the Cattle-raising, Agriculture and Fishing Ministry and the Management of Planning and the National 
Administration of Public Education must also be mentioned.   37
3.6  Judiciary 
Uruguay has a strong and prestigious tradition in law studies and a numerous and competent 
body of lawyers, prosecutors and judges. The high standard of development of legal studies has 
allowed important levels of specialisation, mainly in civil, commercial, family, criminal, minor, 
customs and administrative law.  
Unlike the state bureaucracy described above, the judiciary has an important tradition of 
independence and professionalism vis-à-vis the political process. The Supreme Court is 
appointed by a two-thirds vote of the Uruguayan Senate. Given the scope of fragmentation at the 
party system level, the rule of two-thirds for judicial appointments isolates the judiciary from 
major political discretion and manipulation. Traditionally, the Uruguayan judiciary has been 
impervious to political influence, and this reputation has formed the basis of its high levels of 
public support. The Supreme Court is the organ responsible for the appointment of judges and 
overseeing the judiciary. In 1993, the Supreme Court created a Consultant Commission for the 
promotions of magistrates. This Commission consists of five members: a Minister of the 
Supreme Court who presides, a Minister of the Appellate Courts, a representative of the 
Magistrates Association, a representative of the Lawyers College and a representative of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of the Republic. This Commission develops annual lists 
consisting of 10 magistrates who are suitable for promotion. 
After the re-establishment of democracy, the judicial system in Uruguay was subject to 
several important reform initiatives. These initiatives received a strong stimulus during 
Sanguinetti’s first presidency, at the request of the University of the Republic’s law faculty and 
of Vice President Enrique Tarigo, a professor in that faculty and an expert in procedural law. 
Within this framework, two important innovations took place in 1988. First, the new General 
Procedural Code (CGP) was approved. This code, which replaced the one that had been in effect 
since 1876, was aimed at making the judicial process easier and more democratic. In order to 
accomplish this, the CGP established the oral trial in civil, commercial, family, labor and 
administrative disputes. Secondly, an institution specializing in the training of magistrates was 
created (the Centre of Judicial Studies of Uruguay—CEJU). The creation of the CEJU was an 
outgrowth of the implementation of the new procedural mechanisms. The CGP created an abrupt 
need for judges and for training courses for professionals who had to start using the Code. Since 
the creation of CEJU, the institution’s graduates have priority admission to the magistracy and to   38
judicial careers. The creation of CEJU and the Consultant Commission has strengthened the 
meritocratic rule in the Uruguayan judicial system. 
In addition to the judicial apparatus that depends on the Supreme Court, there exists the 
Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo (TCA), which is in charge of delivering justice at the 
government administrative level. In fact, most claims against government decisions are generally 
submitted to the TCA after they have gone through the corresponding office and the upper 
hierarchical levels. The TCA has three members appointed by Congress and is typically 
composed of judges rather than politicians. This is an autonomous judicial body financed by a 
specific item of the national budget. 
Proceedings at the TCA are usually very costly and follow patterns typical of the 
Uruguayan bureaucracy. TCA decisions tend to take years, particularly when some political and 
economic complexity is involved.
28 Therefore, the ability of the judiciary to reverse government 
decisions exists, but it could be of little material impact in most of the important cases. The only 
important exception took place in 1992 during the Lacalle Administration. In this case, the 
government was able to pass a small piece of legislation reforming social security within the 
budget bill. After it was approved in Congress, the law was appealed by individual citizens and 
declared unconstitutional the Supreme Court, following the Uruguayan procedure. However, the 
sentence opened the door for an enormous number of appeals that resulted in a strong political 
mobilization against the law by the association of pensioners and retirees. This mobilization led 
to a plebiscite held concomitantly with the 1994 elections, where an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate (85 percent) supported revoking the law and prohibiting the possibility of passing 
social security reforms in budget laws. 
Despite healthy levels of institutional independence, the Uruguayan judiciary also faces 
some obstacles to modernization. Naturally, one of the main ones comes from financial 
restrictions. The administrative members of the judiciary earn very low salaries. The majority of 
judicial offices are inadequate, and there is not enough information-processing equipment. 
However, it should be noted that since 1985 the Uruguayan state has made an effort to improve 
the salaries of magistrates. 
                                                 
28 One interesting example refers to a claim submitted by potential providers of paid TV in Montevideo, who in 
February 1994 were awaiting government authorization. They had 10-year permits, which expired before the TCA 
issued a judgement. The Adjunct State Attorney in the administrative jurisdiction submitted her report to the TCA in 
August, 2003, that is, nine and a half years after the claim was submitted!   39
The judiciary has also some important institutional problems. One main drawback is the 
lack of specialization in economic and financial problems and crimes. In particular, the 
Uruguayan judicial body has not developed experience in adequately solving contractual 
disputes involving any economic complexity. Additionally, the lack of specialized staff or 
specific courts has not been offset by resources that could allow for the subcontracting of these 
activities (Bergara, 2003). 
Another institutional problem is that the judiciary does not have financial independence. 
Although formally, it is supposed to develop its own budget according to the Constitution, in 
reality its economic resources are determined by the Budget Office, which depends on the 
Executive. Thus, it has an important handicap in handling its own budget, with important 
restrictions imposed by the Executive  in the national budgetary process. This financial 
dependence conspires, at least partly, against the equilibrium between the Executive and the 
judiciary. 
Finally, the Uruguayan institutional design has established a Supreme Court without the 
ability to declare certain bills unconstitutional during their consideration in Congress. The Court 
can only be an effective veto gate once a bill has been approved by Congress and once an 
individual citizen has been affected by it. Only when those individual citizens ask for the bill to 
be declared unconstitutional can the Court intervene. The central point here is that the judiciary 
has a limited ability to undertake policy reversals when the Executive or the legislature promotes 
unconstitutional bills. However, despite these formal proceedings, both the Executive and the 
legislature are strategically oriented to minimize the costs of further defeats, particularly when 
certain laws are politicized by opposition parties. 
Milnitsky (2004) presents some indexes related to the quality and celerity of judicial 
activity in Uruguay. The annual demand for judicial services involves approximately 200,000 
cases, which must be added to a typical load of 300,000 cases initiated in previous years. In 
terms of quality, one of every seven definitive sentences is appealed, and approximately half  are 
totally or partially revoked. In terms of celerity, the average clearance rate (the ratio between the 
number of cases solved and the number of cases initiated) for the period 1995-2000 is lower than 
1 (0.91) and the congestion rate (the ratio between the total caseload of the system and the 
number of cases solved) represents almost three years, with an increasing trend, consistent with 
the system’s inability to clear the annual demand. An international comparison of indicators   40
suggests that the Uruguayan judicial system exhibits levels of celerity similar to those of other 
Latin American countries such as Argentina and Costa Rica, at least for civil and family cases. 
Courts take on average between 15 and 25 months to rule on civil, penal, administrative and 
labor issues and 40 months in customs issues. Additionally, Appeals Courts take from seven to 
10 months on average to achieve definitive sentences. 
3.7 Interest Groups 
Given the influence exerted by parties and the overall political process on the state apparatus, 
interest groups have had different roles depending on the interaction between parties and the 
state. During those years marked by state expansion in the economy and in the provision of 
public goods, interest groups focused their pressures and demands in political parties in the 
search for rents and particularistic benefits. The political system and parties in particular 
responded to those requests by regulating specific areas of the economy, in which import-
substitution industrialization shows a paradigmatic momentum. Business firms and economic 
agents took for granted those mechanisms until partisan preferences shifted toward more policy-
oriented principles. The end of the import-substitution model also signalled, by default, some 
changes in the particular type of interaction between rent seekers and political parties. 
More recently, interest groups have occupied a relatively different role in the 
policymaking process. First, interests groups have been able to use legal instruments like 
plebiscites and referenda in order to veto some policies preferred by the governing coalitions or 
to impose their own preferences on the overall political system. These clean and visible veto 
mechanisms have been frequently used during the last years and remain one of the most 
important weapons in the hands of most labor interests and pensioners. Second, interest groups 
have been also able to interact ex ante and ex post in the policymaking process, affecting the 
overall performance of different policies. In terms of ex ante policy enactments, many organized 
interest groups exert important pressure on  executive and legislative powers. Ex post, if those 
pressures are unproductive during the design and approval stages of the policymaking process, 
some interest groups are able to exert enough political pressure at the party system and executive 
levels that the policy implementation and enforcement can remain incomplete. Both visible and 
accountable veto mechanisms via plebiscites and obscure ones at the implementation stage have 
been observed in recent years in the Uruguayan political process. Interestingly, political parties 
play a relevant role in both cases.   41
The political action of business organizations has shifted to exert influence on public 
policies through direct contact with the Executive, the bureaucracy and, subsidiarily, with the 
legislature (Zurbriggen, 1999). They display more veto power to counteract specific initiatives 
rather than hegemonic leadership to impose coherent public policies (Caetano, 1992). The 
interest groups channel their demands through the political parties, which develop a key role as 
mediators of diverse interests and pressures. 
Unlike other countries in the region, Uruguayan businessmen have not seemed too 
willing either to support relevant research centers or think tanks, or to hire specialists. At least in 
some sectors, this process appears to be changing very gradually. 
4. The Dynamics of Political Preferences: An Overview 
For many years researchers investigating Uruguayan politics have argued that the ideological 
differences between the Blancos and Colorados
29 were not relevant. Although nowadays this 
interpretation is being reviewed (De Armas, Garcé and Yaffé, 2003), it is not easy to establish 
those parties’ ideology. The main difficulty lies in the fact that both parties have generated, 
throughout history, factions with noticeably different preferences. In spite of this, the task of 
defining the ideology of the Blancos and Colorados is not impossible. Firstly, in each historical 
period, there is generally a more influential faction in each party. When that influence persists, 
the whole party becomes “tinted” with the preferences of its predominant faction. Secondly, 
beyond the differences in each party there is a preference zone that is common to all the 
factions.
30 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Colorado Party occupied an extensive 
political space from the center to the left. Actually, during that period, the ideological position of 
the Colorado Party was determined by the predominance of batllismo
31 in the internal political 
competition. The substantive preferences of batllismo can be compared to those of the social 
democracy or labor parties. Searching for economic growth and an improvement in income 
distribution, the batllistas
32 expanded the role of the state, protected national industry and 
                                                 
29 Partisans of the Partido Nacional  and the Partido Colorado, respectively. 
30 Parties in the U.S. have recently been analyzed from a similar perspective. See Gerring (2000). 
31 Batllismo was the most important fraction of the Colorado Party, built around the outstanding leadership of José 
Batlle y Ordóñez, who held the presidency for two periods (1903-1907 and 1911-1915), shaping some of the more 
important features of modern Uruguay. 
32 Partisans of batllismo.   42
developed an enlarged welfare state. The National Party (the Blancos), meanwhile, occupied a 
space from the center to the right. During those years, the Blancos questioned the batllista model 
in the name of the principles of economic liberalism and cattlemen’s interests. 
Since the economic crisis of the 1950s, this ideological map has suffered deep changes. 
In fact, between 1971 and 1989, the relative position of the Blancos and Colorados in the left-
right axis experienced a reversal: the Colorados abandoned the left and adopted economic 
liberalism  while the Blancos moved towards the left, encouraged by the influence of ECLAC 
theories. Those changes are deeply associated with the leadership of Jorge Batlle in the Colorado 
Party and Wilson Ferreira in the National Party. Since Wilson Ferreira’s death in 1989, the 
National Party has returned to its traditional place. Simultaneously, the Colorado Party, then 
under Julio María Sanguinetti’s leadership, tried to occupy the space of center and center-left. 
Although between 1989 and 1990 it reached a position to the left of the National Party, 
the Colorado Party could never return resolutely to the left because of the emergence of the 
Frente Amplio. In spite of Sanguinetti’s efforts, the Colorados inexorably abandoned the left 
wing. In a few years, this party capitalized on the political legacy of batllismo: today it occupies 
an extensive ideological space from the left to the center, while the Blancos and Colorados share 
the space from the center to the right.  
In 1984, with the re-establishment of democracy, the levels of polarization were lower 
than those of 1971 (González, 1993). This trend towards the center was consolidated during the 
following years by changes in the Colorado Party (i.e., the disappearance of its most right-wing 
faction under the leadership of ex-president Pacheco) and by the gradual programmatic and 
political moderation of the Frente Amplio. Until the early 1960s, Uruguay had a moderate two 
party system. At the beginning of the 1970s, the scenario changed deeply: the number of parties 
increased and polarization grew. After the dictatorship, the number of parties did not change, but 
polarization slowed down, so that the current Uruguayan political system can be described as 
moderate and multi-party. 
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Chart 1. 









1925 1928 1931 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999
Partido Colorado Partido Nacional
Frente Amplio Nuevo Espacio
 
 
After a process of ideological and programmatic evolution, the left ended up tuning in 
with the median voter. Through a systematic opposition to essentially all reforms, the left 
became the political force that best interprets the Uruguayan “batllista political culture.” Of 
course, to get to this stage the left had to go through a deep change. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 made it easier for the Frente Amplio to start a slow but systematic turn toward the centre. 
The thriving economic liberalism that followed the collapse of the socialist system and the crisis 
of the welfare state made a deep impression on the left. The Frente Amplio abandoned radicalism 
regarding the state and the nationalist ideas it used to have at the beginning of the 1970s. Its 
current program can be defined in general as social democratic. Although it still assigns an 
important role to the state with regard to the administration of the economy, it does not promote 
nationalization policies and recognizes the role of private initiative (Garcé and Yaffé, 2004).  
An overview of the dynamics of political preferences helps to understand why public 
policies in Uruguay have been reformed in such a moderate and gradual way. During 
Sanguinetti’s two presidencies (1985-1989 and 1995-1999), but especially during his second 
one, Sanguinetti made sure his political discourse and his workings in office were not far 
removed from the predominant preferences of the citizenship regarding state intervention and   44
social policies. Any effort to explain the content of the reforms that were implemented over those 
years is likely to fail if it does not take this into account. Additionally, Sanguinetti’s political 
preferences tended to be closer to social democratic ideas rather than to liberal ones. The 
possibility of forming political and social coalitions capable of repealing laws passed by 
Congress has required presidents to be extraordinarily cautious and to try not to affect the 
interests of those groups with veto and mobilization power. The referendum and plebiscite rules 
are key institutional ingredients in understanding the moderation of the liberal reforms carried 
out in Uruguay from 1990 onward. 
This ideological moderation process, in the context of diminishing party system 
polarization, created a favorable scenario for the construction of agreements between the 
traditional parties and the left-wing opposition—in theory. However, there have been low levels 
of cooperation between the Blancos and the Colorados on one side, and the left on the other. 
Both political blocs have contributed to this situation. The Blancos and Colorados have generally 
preferred to leave the left one the margins of the main negotiations, probably to impede its 
movement towards the center. The left has chosen a clear opposition policy, systematically and 
indiscriminately querying the successive governments. 
From 1985 on, with a few exceptions such as the constitutional reform of 1996 (the 
reform of Social Security or the ANCAP Association Law that has been recently repealed), the 
Colorados and Blancos did not look for the cooperation of the opposition in Congress. Not only 
was it easier for them, but it was also politically more convenient to reach agreements between 
themselves than with the left-wing opposition. Regarding substantive preferences, the ideological 
distance between the Blancos and Colorados is far less than it is between either of them and the 
left wing. Regarding political strategies, traditional parties have had no interest in supporting the 
left wing’s growth and they did not need it to pass laws. Apparently, the leaders of the traditional 
parties were convinced that the best way to prevent the left wing from growing was, precisely, to 
keep it away from relevant decision-making. Excluding the left wing from taking part in political 
agreements on relevant issues had two objectives from an electoral point of view. First, it 
showed that the problems of the country could still be solved by the traditional parties without 
the cooperation of the left-wing opposition. Second, it hindered the political moderation of the 
left wing and its shift towards the center. The traditional parties abandoned the exclusion strategy   45
only when they believed that reforms would not be possible without the inclusion of the 
opposition.  
Nevertheless, the lack of agreements between successive governments and the left wing 
cannot be explained only by the political strategies of the Blancos and Colorados. It is essential 
to take into account the fact that the opposition did not show any interest in cooperating. Since 
the creation of Frente Amplio in 1971, most of its leaders have believed that the best way to 
increase the electoral support of the left wing is to adopt an opposition strategy of systematically 
questioning the governments. Uruguayan electoral behavior seems to have validated this 
strategy. Between 1984 and 1999, which was essentially a period of economic growth and 
poverty reduction, the opposition doubled the number of votes it received, becoming the most 
political party that received the greatest number of votes. 
In summary, after the dictatorship, the differences among the left wing and the other 
parties diminished. However, the political strategies orienting electoral competition among 
relevant actors hindered the building of bridges between the parties that formed the government 
and the left-wing opposition. 
5. A Characterization of the Policymaking Process 
5.1 A Brief Description of the PMP 
The Uruguayan policymaking process is determined by four broad institutional features: (i) the 
presidential regime that sets fixed terms for both executive and legislative powers; (ii) a 
president with strong legislative powers to control the ability of parties and legislators to 
influence the PMP; (iii) a multiparty system with factionalized parties; and (iv) institutional 
devices that enable the use of direct democracy to reform the constitution or endorse laws. The 
combination of the first three factors determines to a large extent the features of the PMP with a 
cyclical pattern consisting of two discernible periods within each presidential term, characterized 
by cooperation and conflict.  
In the context of a presidential regime with a multiparty system, most Uruguayan 
presidents since 1985 have been forced to form governmental coalitions to pass their policies. 
Thus, before each government takes power, most presidents have to negotiate the policies to be 
incorporated into the political agenda. This process leads to an intense inter and intra-party   46
negotiation process
33 based on the exchange of political support for strategic bills (for the 
president) for cabinet positions demanded by those parties and factions that will be part of the 
governmental coalition. 
During the span of time that executives are supported by the governmental coalition, 
presidents are able to pass (or at least partially pass) the agenda and the policies negotiated at the 
coalition-formation stage. However, as the presidential term progresses, the incentives for those 
who cooperate with the president decrease, given that the electoral calendar forces coalition 
members to compete. Indeed, the payoff structure of governmental coalitions under presidential 
systems determines that those who support successful governments will receive small benefits 
(votes), and for this reason coalition termination before the electoral campaign begins is a 
precondition for avoiding such electoral inefficiencies. If the president is unsuccessful, the 
coalition partners have obvious incentives to abandon the coalition as elections approach. But 
even if the president is successful, they have incentives to abandon the coalition, since the 
president himself (or his faction) will stand to gain more from the support than the coalition 
partners do.
 34  
 
                                                 
33 The intra-party negotiation is the result of the predominant model of parties. Given that parties are factionalized, 
presidents have to negotiate policies with other factions within their parties, in addition to the inter-party negotiation 
in order to form a governmental coalition.    
34 This political cycle has to be expected in all presidential regimes with simultaneous elections and fixed terms for 
presidents. However, some political systems where these conditions are met also show a less pronounced cycle or 
one that has a minor impact on the policymaking process. In most of these cases there are other institutional devices 
that buffer political or institutional conflict between presidents and assemblies (Shugart and Carey, 1992). For 
instance, the presidential re-election allowed by the 1997 constitutional reform in Brazil dramatically changed the 
positioning of political parties regarding electoral competition and their strategies toward the Executive. Something 
similar can be observed in Chile with the system of binominal districts, which forces parties to cooperate by being 
part of coalitions. Overall, some institutional devices beyond fixed terms and simultaneous elections can induce 
higher levels of cooperation during presidential mandates (See Chasquetti, 2001).   47
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As can be observed in Chart 2, while cooperation periods enable presidents to pass their 
agenda, competition periods are characterized by a presidential inability to buffer the policy 
preferences of the legislature and the opposition parties. Additionally, the 1996 constitutional 
amendment introduced party primaries four months before national elections, extending the 
competitive period.
35 In sum, cooperation periods yield policy formation under political 
agreements, while competition periods are more prone to policy stalemate or status quo (Buquet 
et al., 1998). This dynamics implies an ability to develop some political exchanges and get some 
cooperation in several areas, although that cooperation will be difficult to sustain until the end of 
presidential mandates because of the logic of the electoral competition mentioned before.  
The PMP evolves under the above-mentioned political and institutional dynamics. 
Theoretically, the PMP can be analyzed taking into account the agenda-setting and the policy-
design processes. The agenda-setting process in Uruguay is determined by the cyclical pattern of 
government described above. At the outset of each government, presidents and coalition partners 
                                                 
35 In addition to the extension of competitive periods, the new constitution also introduced the split of national and 
local or sub-national elections to be held in May of the first year of nationally elected governments. This change 
means that coalition partners who are supposed be cooperating by passing the governmental agenda are competing 
at the subnational level. For this reason, Batlle was able to start passing his agenda only after subnational elections 
took place.      48
bargain on a set of policies that will prevail in the legislative arena. By implication, those 
policies will have political support in Congress. In addition to those contexts in which presidents 
are supported by governmental coalitions, some institutional features give them an important 
asymmetry in the congressional arena. Indeed, Uruguayan presidents have exclusive initiative in 
relevant policy areas, such as the budgetary process, tax policy and the ability to appoint new 
personnel for key administrative posts. Thus, during cooperation periods, presidents are able to 
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According to Chart 3, the political context undergoes significant changes as term 
mandates advance, since most presidents systematically lose political support toward the end of 
their terms. Systematically, during the last two years of each government, the agenda tends to 
shift from the policy preferences of the Executive toward the policy preferences of the 
legislature, and particularly favors those who are leaving the coalition or more punctual 
governmental agreements. During the second part of the cycle, the policy agenda follows a more 
particularistic pattern, given electoral proximity and the fact that during the first part of the cycle   49
legislators were working with the policy preferences of the Executive.
36 During this period, 
legislators are more prone to respond (via legislation or simple attention) to more narrow 
constituencies, which can be observed in the small peaks of important legislation endorsed 
during the last year of each government (see Chart 3). Given that Parliament becomes more 
proactive in the legislative process, it is also expected that presidents will be more prone to react 
to its policy preferences. For this reason, executive vetoes become more frequent during the last 
part of each government. Presidents can veto legislative initiatives (also with item vetoes) 
without restrictions on policy areas and can be overridden by a three-fifths vote in each chamber 
(Magar and Moraes, 2003).   
The process of policy design is also strongly determined by institutional rules and 
structures. Presidents have not only exclusive power of legislative introduction in some policy 
areas, but can also tap into key institutional sources of expertise located in the bureaucratic 
apparatus. In contrast, Parliament lacks these resources for designing public policy. Given that 
legislators gain their nomination from faction leaders and those leaders are policy brokers who 
negotiate policies (via coalitions or particular agreements) with other parties or factions, 
individual legislators have no incentive to create strong institutions within Congress.
37 To a large 
extent, congressional institutions serve to diminish the level of uncertainty produced by the 
impact of the policies enacted by individual legislators. Low levels of uncertainty will be always 
preferred by individual legislators in order to improve their electoral fortunes. This is only true if 
legislators depend on themselves to gain re-election, as Krehbiel (1991) argues. However, if 
                                                 
36 Interest groups have limited influence as agenda-setters. However, they have important veto power. Generally, 
interest groups exert direct pressure on the Executive in order to modify or reverse some policy decisions. When 
those pressures are ineffective, interest groups shift their efforts toward Congress and particularly to the committee 
structure.  
37 The Uruguayan Parliament has a relatively small budget. Individual legislators can count on small amounts of 
money to finance and solve their particular needs in terms of staff, information and logistic resources. The internal 
institutions geared to fulfilling legislators’ needs are scarce and are not well-equipped in terms of human resources 
or technical knowledge of public policies. During 1997, the IDB financed a large research project to evaluate the 
viability of introducing a permanent technical staff to assist the needs of legislators in different policy areas. 
However, Uruguayan legislators and administrative staff frustrated the reform. In particular, Uruguayan politicians 
have been reluctant to use think tank research and individuals specialized in policy areas of strategic importance, 
such as telecommunications, energy and also institutional or political reforms. The legislature and individual 
legislators have followed two types of bypasses to solve the lack of technical knowledge. On the one hand, since the 
legislature delegates a large part of the policy design to the executive branch, all committees require information and 
opinion from ministers and public firms directors in order to have a better look at the policies under consideration. 
This process has intensified during the last coalition governments from 1990 onward. On the other hand, legislators 
are allowed to request the transfer of public servants to work on their particular staff. Those public servants are 
generally professionals working in areas of particular interest to the legislator.    50
legislators depend on party or faction leaders to gain office, their incentives to create strong 
legislative institutions are few (Moraes, 2004).  
The Executive has an important set of specialized agencies and experts that are in most 
cases responsible for designing public policies delivered to the legislative arena. The legislature, 
however, has a limited set of resources and specialized staff to produce public policies. Indeed, 
neither parties nor the legislature have think tanks or specialized bodies dedicated to designing 
public policies.  
Normally, coalition legislators can influence policy design through the legislative 
process. The most important bills get into Congress through the Senate (Chasquetti and Lanzaro, 
2003). The senate committee in charge has the authority to make changes and, as a general rule, 
committees frequently amend executive proposals, negotiating with the president or individual 
members of the Cabinet. Additionally, interest groups, bureaucrats and experts participate in the 
discussion of each particular bill. Therefore, the negotiation process involves not only strong 
executive influence, but also the important participation of key legislators in the committee 
structure.
38 
From the brief and preliminary description developed here, it must be noted that the 
number of veto gates and veto players with power over policy decisions is relatively large due to 
the set of institutions (presidential regime with bicameral legislature) and political agents 
operating within the system (fragmentation and party factionalization). In addition to these 
factors, plebiscites and referenda are a tremendously influential factor in the way parties, factions 
and governmental institutions interact. These mechanisms of direct democracy have played a 
relevant role in Uruguayan politics since the restoration of democracy by imposing serious 
constraints on the enactment of important reforms endorsed by the legislative and executive 
branches.
 Overall, despite the presence of these different types of vetoes, the system has been 
relatively stable in maintaining a systematic path in the policymaking process, with a clear 
political cycle. 
                                                 
38 Each chamber determines the set of standing committees that they will have at the beginning of each legislature. 
Overall, the number of those committees has increased during the last few decades. For instance, during the period 
1985-1990, both chambers had nine standing committees, but the current legislature’s (2000-2005) lower chamber 
and Senate have 14 and 15 standing committees, respectively. In addition to these committees, each chamber can 
create ad hoc or special committees to investigate a certain type of policy or to oversee executive decisions and 
policies. These types of committees require special majorities to be created and their survival is very limited, since 
they are created with very specific purposes (see: www.parlamento.gub.uy).    51
5.2 The Dynamics of the Policymaking Process 
Hitherto, the static aspects of the Uruguayan policymaking process have been discussed. This 
section discusses the dynamic. First, the executive branch is the main agent in the legislative 
process, but the legislature retains the power to veto executive proposals and shift the policy 
preferences of the president (Cox and Morgenstern, 2002). Executives set the agenda by using 
different prerogatives and rely upon strong bureaucratic and administrative mechanisms that 
allow them to design their policy preferences.
39  
Second, the opposition party (the Frente Amplio) has no incentive to become a policy 
maker within the legislature given that governmental coalitions simply pass their own agenda. 
Thus, since 1985, the Frente Amplio has increasingly become a control agent rather than a policy 
maker as a consequence of its own position outside the presidency and governmental coalitions 
(Chasquetti, 2004).
40  
Third, there are implicit delegation mechanisms from the legislature to the Executive. By 
delegating policy design to the executive branch, government or coalition legislators are able to 
dedicate their time and resources to serving their constituents by providing particularistic 
benefits in the form of small pieces of legislation and casework (Moraes, 2004).
41 This type of 
delegation allow pressure groups to focus their lobbying on the executive branch rather than the 
legislature and individual legislators, despite the fact that those interest groups participate during 
the legislative process and particularly at the committee level. Furthermore, interest groups are 
mostly interested in influencing coalition members because they are part of the executive branch. 
Thus, their incentives to knock on legislators’ doors are less than those to pressure the Executive 
and those who join the governmental coalition. Furthermore, the dynamics of executive-
legislative relations also affects the incentives for creating legislative institutions. During the two 
to three years of cooperation within each governmental cycle, the Senate is motivated to work 
with the presidential or coalitional agenda. Thus, it does not have any incentive to create 
                                                 
39 The Uruguayan Executive is structured around 11 ministries with areas of specialization and control over 
programs. Additionally, the Executive has an Office of Planning and Budget that designs and controls the 
development and execution of the national budget.     
40 During 1985-2003, the Frente Amplio submitted a total of 9,217 requests for information to the executive branch, 
representing 60.4 percent of all requests made by Parliament during that period. However, since 1997, the Frente 
Amplio has intensified its requests, representing more than 80 percent.    
41 Uruguayan legislators invest 28 hours a week (on average) in providing help to individual voters. This number of 
hours is almost equal to other countries in which legislators have notorious institutional incentives to provide 
particularistic benefits and goods to their voters, such as the Brazilian case (Hagopian, 2002).    52
institutions to produce informational resources during this stage. However, during the second 
part of the governmental cycle, legislators are attuned to the electoral competition and their own 
constituencies and so the incentives to create those institutions and informational resources are 
also low.  
Fourth, since parties are strong, logrolling is negligible in the Uruguayan Parliament, 
with the sole exception of low-profile bills submitted at the end of legislative terms (Weingast 
and Marshall, 1988). For this reason, legislators have few incentives to create legislative 
institutions to improve their chances of passing their policy preferences and, by implication, their 
probability of being re-elected. However, from an informational point of view (Krehbiel, 1991), 
only the Frente Amplio has the incentives to create those institutions or informational resources. 
Given that coalition partners or governmental parties delegate the policy formation and the 
informational resources to the executive branch, these parties have no incentives to create those 
institutions. Hence, only the opposition party has the incentives to create those resources or 
institutions within Parliament. Additionally, the Frente Amplio has the highest re-election rates, 
which supports the thesis that the creation of specialized bureaus and informational resources are 
linked. 
Fifth, the lack of incentives for building institutional capacities does not stem from the 
fact that re-election rates are low. Rather, the Uruguayan case shows comparatively high levels 
of turnover in the region. More specifically, between 49.54 and 65 percent of those seeking re-
election in the 1989-94 and 1999 elections achieved their goal (Altman and Chasquetti, 2002). 
This evidence reinforces the argument that low re-election rates do not explain the weakness of 
legislative institutions in Uruguay. 
Sixth, the legislature also holds some power over executive programs and specific 
agencies because it generally intervenes during the policymaking process to grant itself further 
mechanisms of control. This type of delegation may not result in an efficient way of transferring 
power through administrative procedures. Generally, many institutions face several problems in 
executing their objectives due to the fact that legislators and parties usually exert pressure over 
those agencies to shift their policies. Interest groups also exert direct pressure to revert policy 
decisions made by those agencies. As can be expected, the type of pressure exerted by those 
interest groups leads to poor levels of institutional performance given the dominance of informal 
channels of interest representation.    53
Finally, a relevant feature of the Uruguayan policymaking process is that executives 
never bypass the legislature. Unlike many Latin American countries where executives 
circumvent legislatures by using their decree power and other institutional devices, Uruguayan 
presidents do not have such power. Even in those cases where the Executive has some inclination 
to regulate via decree some policies passed by Congress, the Executive never violates the 
stipulations made by the negotiations that lead to proper law. The Uruguayan political system 
has a strong legalist tradition whereby the legislature and the Executive interact to produce 
public policies.  
There have been no instances since Pacheco’s presidency in 1968 in which the Executive 
has tried to circumvent the legislature. Indeed, the Executive has no legal instruments (such as 
decree powers or administrative procedures), but in some cases in which there is deadlock, 
political negotiations have always prevailed. If presidents usurp the legislature’s rights, and 
particularly some of the core policy preferences of the left-wing party, the costs of this type of 
action can surpass the benefits. Since the opposition can be a relatively easy promoter of 
plebiscites and individuals can use judicial powers to declare laws and decrees unconstitutional, 
executives have tried to avoid these actions by broadening political negotiations. Overall, gains 
in representativeness or “democratic inclusiveness” can be observed as inefficiencies in the way 
public policies are made, given the number of veto gates (as institutions) and veto players 
operating within the political system (as political actors). 
6. The Perception of Relevant Actors 
In order to understand the perceptions of the key political and social actors regarding the 
relationship between political institutions and the policymaking process, the research team 
carried out an elite survey. The relevant actors’ perception of these issues can be taken as a 
crucial ingredient in understanding the process and the political culture in the country. The 
survey includes 46 variables related to the policymaking process, the inclination to agreements 
and the perception of changes and stability in public policies. Respondents were selected from a 
pool of Uruguayan “elites,” including ministers, legislators, mayors, directors of public 
enterprises, leader of unions and businessmen, scholars and journalists.   54
A first approximation of the policymaking process arises from the diverse degrees of 
influence that these elites assigned to different private and public institutions.
42 According to 
their perceptions, the Executive plays the predominant role in the process. Political parties and 
the media come in second, while the legislature places third, along with local governments and 
public enterprises. Businessmen and unions are also viewed as having some influence, while the 
judiciary and other groups such as the church and NGOs are perceived as having no significant 
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Executive-legislative relations are at the core of the policymaking process. The view that 
the legislature obstructs the Executive is not widely held among the Uruguayan elite (10 
percent), though businessmen are more inclined to think so (20 percent). The elites are divided 
among those who perceive there to be a well-balanced relationship between both government 
branches (39 percent) and those who believe that the Executive imposes on the legislature (50 
                                                 
42 The “degree of influence” is an average of the responses giving a 0 value to the answer “nothing,” 10/3 to “little,” 
20/3 to “enough,” and 10 to “a lot.” All indexes of degree that appear below follow the same criteria.   55
percent). As can be expected, members of the executive clearly prefer the equilibrium vision (63 
percent), while legislators favor the vision of the imposition of the Executive (56 percent). 
The survey also tried to examine the role of the legislature in the policymaking process. 
Broadly speaking, the elites believe the legislature has relatively little influence over policy 
design or its control and oversight. They feel the only area over which the legislature has some 
influence is the development of the national budget, assigning it 5.75 points on a 10-point scale 
of “degree of influence.” The budgetary process is the only environment in which Uruguayan 
society as a whole (political and not political) sees the Parliament as a key actor. Additionally, 
the elites think that the time typically taken by Congress to pass a law is excessive (55 percent), 
and that its productivity is not adequate (63 percent). 
Another topic included in the survey was the perception of positive changes in public 
policies. In general, the elites tended to feel that there have been few changes in Uruguayan 
policies since 1985, coinciding with the common view that the country is reluctant to innovate, is 
quite conservative and is gradualist in the application of measures. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting the perception of some improvements related to the modernization of state-owned 
enterprises, which received almost six points on a 10-point scale of “degree of change.” Given 
the incorporation of new technologies, the improvement in the quality of services, and, in some 
cases, price declines, this appears to be the area of the state seen as the most dynamic and 
efficient. On the other hand, the worst performance is assigned to the inefficiency of the public 
administration, with a 3.69 score. 
We also explored the elites’ view of the possibility of achieving agreements in different 
areas of public policy. In the first place, social and foreign policies appear to be the areas where 
the elites believe agreements would be more feasible (64 percent think that is possible to reach 
significant agreements). Secondly, some elites believe that some agreement can be reached in an 
extensive set of public policies (trade opening, economic policy, public utilities, retirements and 
pensions, fiscal policy, tax reform, state reform and financial opening), although these elites do 
not constitute a majority. Finally, there are two areas in which the elites clearly mistrust any 
possibility of agreement: labor flexibilization and privatizations, where more than 85 percent of 
those polled felt there could only be minor agreements or none at all. Those two areas have been 
the source of main political conflicts in recent years.   56
The study finally tackles the perception of the elites with respect to the stability of 
diverse Uruguayan public policies. In general terms, public policies are qualified as having an 
intermediate level of stability; though there are important differences according to the policy in 
question. In the first place, it is worth emphasizing the great stability that the elites attribute to 
the policy of public liberties, which received 7.18 points on a 10-point scale of “degree of 
stability.” It can be said that the notion of a consolidated and sound democracy is clearly 
reflected in the answers of those polled. Second, there was a very extensive group of policies that 
qualified as having intermediate levels of stability. Financial and trade opening stand out among 
them, with the greatest scores (5.88 and 5.73, respectively). A second subset (taxation policy, 
legal security, international relations, public expenditures, social security and public utilities) 
were qualified with just intermediate stability, with scores around 5 points. Educational and 
health policies remain more relegated, and received scores that clearly show them to have low 
stability (4.33 and 4.00, respectively). Finally, state reform is the policy with the worst 
performance in terms of stability (3.82). Linking this indicator with the poor evaluation of public 
administration in terms of change, one can conclude that the Uruguayan elite are quite critical of 
the performance of the state. 
7. Epilogue 
In October 2004, the left-wing party (Frente Amplio) finally won the presidential and 
congressional elections. For the first time in Uruguayan history, a third party will hold control 
executive branch with a majority in Parliament. This electoral change has several implications 
for the policymaking process and perhaps for the type of policies to be implemented during the 
next five years of government. In particular, one can observe four main features of the newly 
elected government.  
First, the new government was elected with 52 percent of the popular vote. Unlike the 
coalition and minority governments elected since 1985, these electoral results imply that the 
Frente Amplio will hold a clear majority in Parliament. In addition, this type of majority party 
government has another salient difference with previous political configurations: so far 
presidents have been primus inter pares within their parties, while the Frente Amplio is headed 
by a single party leader as a primus solus.    57
Second, as with most majority party governments, the Cabinet will be in the hands of a 
single party instead of a coalition of parties, as has occurred in Uruguay during the last 15 years. 
Additionally, the newly elected president appointed all major faction leaders to Cabinet positions 
with the aim of ensuring party discipline in Parliament. In this way, the Cabinet will lead the 
policy-formation and agenda-setting processes a la Westminster model, where the legislative 
branch plays a minor role in the political process.   
Third, based on the two previous features, the Uruguayan policymaking process, which 
so far has been characterized by two to three years of cooperation followed by increasing levels 
of inter-branch conflict, is expected to experience a smoothing trend. The new PMP will be 
facilitated by the fact that the Frente Amplio will have a clear majority in Parliament, and it is 
quite likely that Parliament will endorse the overwhelming majority of the policy decisions made 
at the Cabinet level.  
Fourth, direct democracy has been widely used by interest groups supported by the Frente 
Amplio. However, with the left wing in office, it is not likely that this institutional device will be 
successfully used by those groups. Given that to a large extent the call for referendums and 
plebiscites requires a large number of signatures to be implemented, the lack of support by the 
party in office will make this mechanism an unlikely way of vetoing policies. 
Finally, the elected government seems to be promoting a smooth transition whereby the 
Cabinet is ensuring a balance between the different sectors within the Frente Amplio and is 
guaranteeing moderation, particularly in those areas dealing with economic policy. Each new 
minister is legitimized as a reliable professional with expertise or experience in his/her policy 
area. 
   58
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Appendix 1: Legislative Process of Three Relevant Laws 
This appendix summarizes the work of Chasquetti and Lanzaro: “A Study of Legislative Process 
in Uruguay: Three relevant laws,” conducted under the framework of the Work Program 
established at the Instituto de Ciencias Políticas of the Universidad de la República to assess the 
legislative process, in agreement with the Legislative Power, with the support of the 
Interparliamentary Union and the UNDP. 
The legislative process in Uruguay was analysed in the context of three laws: Law 
Nº16.211 of Public Enterprises Reform (October, 1, 1991); Law Nº16.713 of Social Security 
Reform (September, 3, 1995); Law Nº17.243 - Urgent Law I (June, 29, 2000). These three laws 
can be considered extremely important legislative pieces, because of their content, the 
innovations proposed within them and their general and particular effects. They were passed by 
Congress during the administrations of Presidents Lacalle (1990-1995), Sanguinetti (1995-2000) 
and Batlle (2000-2005). Congress actively participated in the three cases, voting along party 
lines. During the process, ministers, public authorities, representatives from the interest groups 
involved, advisers and specialists participated in the committees’ works. 
A Reactive Congress. The first conclusion of this study is that Congress, in general 
terms, actively participates in the legislative process, and is not restricted to ratifying projects. In 
the three cases, Congress effectively showed its reactive capacity when faced with initiatives 
coming from the proactive Executive. Nevertheless, the parliamentary influence changes 
according to the strength of the president’s legislative support (majority or not in the Chamber) 
and to the consistency of the Executive’s law-making process. Minor changes are observed in a 
law when the legislative coalition supporting the president is strong and disciplined. When the 
law-making process is consistent and involves wide technical knowledge together with the 
coalition members’ points of view, a law is also subject to less modification. Specifically, the 
case study shows that the projects sent by the Executive are remade in  Congress. Two 
parliamentary instances exist where relevant modifications take place: a) the Chamber 
Committee receiving the project (in these three cases, the Senate) and b) the plenary of the 
Chamber. 
Modifications in the Senate Committees: The Law of Social Security Reform—which 
is the best designed and counts with the support of a strong coalition—experienced less   64
modifications in committee (70 percent of the articles passed without alteration). The Public 
Enterprises Law was the opposite: the corresponding committee removed more than a half of the 
original articles proposed by the Executive (54 percent), modified almost a third (30 percent) and 
left unchanged only 17 percent. 
Modifications in the Chamber of Senators: In the three cases, the committees made the 
agreed-upon changes in the projects. Once the revised projects were presented in the Chamber, 
they experienced new modifications, which were the result of negotiations between 
parliamentary leaders of the government coalition. In the plenary of the Chamber, the Law of 
Social Security Reform once again received the least modifications, given that the most of the 
revised articles remained intact (87 percent). The other two cases received similar treatments as 
in the plenary of the Senate, with the modification of one-third of the articles and the elimination 
of 6 percent. 
Softened Bicameralism. A similar pattern existed in the three processes: in the first 
stage, the Chamber works on the project in two phases (Committee and Plenary), and in the 
second, Chamber avoids the introduction of new modifications. This softened bicameralism 
pattern comes from the agreements established by the Executive (coalition) in order to guarantee 
the sanction of the laws. The partners agree on the approval of the project and know the Senate 
will influence the final decision. Once the law is passed, the Committee in the Chamber of 
Deputies usually tends to ratify it and attempts to leave it that way are systematically refused by 
the majority. Regarding the Law of Public Enterprises Reform and the Law of Social Security 
Reform, it is interesting to note that for them to advance in that way, members of the Deputies 
Chamber (from the coalition parties) participated in the negotiations that took place in the Senate 
Committee.   65
Appendix 2: The Constitutional Reform 
An analysis of the constitutional reform endorsed in 1996 helps to understand the workings of 
the political institutions and the policymaking process. The reform process that took place during 
President Sanguinetti’s second administration was promoted and sustained because of the threat 
posed by a possible electoral victory by the left-wing party (FA) The new electoral rules and 
specifically, the majority run-off for the presidential election, favored the tenure of the reformist 
coalition in office (whether Colorados or Blancos), as well as the political fragmentation and 
internal factionalism of political parties. The reform led to a reduction in the number of lower 
house lists of candidates and of the legislative support of the president, as well as to more 
disciplined legislative conduct on the part of the political parties. First of all, the combination of 
single candidates and the majority run-off system, established by the electoral reform, could 
contribute to weakening the parliamentary position of the president. Under the current rules, the 
legislative representation of the party in government does not have to be the biggest in 
Parliament because there is nothing to stop the election of the candidate of the second party, 
whose representation would be second in number of legislators, as happened in the last election. 
In addition, there is no disposition in the new constitution that guarantees legislative weight to 
the president’s faction. The president is the single candidate from his party, and he can be voted 
for together with any of the parliamentary lists of that party. The votes that the president’s 
faction obtains are relatively independent of the electoral potential that he has, and consequently, 
he may be in the minority in his party. Second, the elimination of the accumulation of sublemas 
(electoral alliances among lists) in the election of representatives has made for a large reduction in 
the number of lists presented in 1999, which amounted to less than a half of those presented in 1994. 
As long as different house lists cannot accumulate their votes, the smaller ones have either to join 
one of the larger ones or unite to build a single list among several of them. On the other hand, the 
reduction in the legislative supply is associated with the predomination of the main national factions 
with respect to local political groups, because the new rules enforce a rigid connection between the 
supply for the Senate and the supply for representatives. Consequently, one can expect more 
disciplined legislative conduct from sectoral representatives. The new electoral calendar also 
introduces some important changes since the reform also compels parties to hold primaries in 
order to present unique presidential candidates. Given that those primaries are held almost one   66
year before the general elections, the governmental process and most political agreements among 
parties were reduced, de facto, by increasing the time for electoral competition. An obvious by-
product of this amendment is that parties and institutions decrease their interest in public 
policies. 
The constitutional reform seems to be an example of the myopia of the political class, 
which pursues short-term benefits to the detriment of long-term certainties. Additionally, the 
reform could not mitigate the political blockade, in spite its intention to include norms that would 
encourage political agreements, negotiation, coalition formation and stability in the Cabinet. This 
did not prove to be true, since the underlying incentives for cooperation and conflict did not 
substantially change. 
 